Southern Methodist University

SMU Scholar
Faculty Journal Articles and Book Chapters

Faculty Scholarship

2021

Cause and Effect in Antidiscrimination Law
Hillel J. Bavli
Southern Methodist University, Dedman School of Law
Author ORCID Identifier:
https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4888-2842

Recommended Citation
Hillel J. Bavli, Cause and Effect in Antidiscrimination Law, 106 IOWA L. REV. 483 (2021)

This document is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at SMU Scholar. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Faculty Journal Articles and Book Chapters by an authorized administrator of SMU
Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.

Cause and Effect in Antidiscrimination
Law
Hillel. Bavli*
ABSTRACT: Standards of causation in antidiscrimination law, and
disparate-treatmentcases in particular, are deeply flawed. Their defects have
caused an illogical, obscure, and unworkableproof scheme that requires an
overhaul to curb the harm that it engenders and to allow the
antidiscriminationstatutes to serve their objectives effectively. This Article
proposes a theory and method of causation that achieves this goal. The
problem stems from the inadequacies associated with current standards of
causation in disparate-treatmentcases-the but-for test and the motivatingfactor test. The proposed 'factorial" approach introduces a causal standard
that addresses these inadequacies. It entails three innovations over current
causation schemes: (z) it adopts a predominantframework for cause and
effect in the sciences, called the "potential-outcomes"framework, as a central
structure in which to sharply define and analyze the causal inquiry; (2) it
employs a causal measure, called the "NESS"test, that refines and, in a sense,
unifies the but-for and motivating-factortests by retainingthe centralfeature
of the but-for test-the "necessity condition "-butin a less restrictive form;
and (3) it applies a legal framework grounded in tort law and recent
advances regardingmultiple sufficient causes. In addition to reflecting actual
cause and effect, the proposed approach promotes antidiscriminationlaw's
deterrence and fairness objectives, and it allows an interpretation of causal
language in antidiscrimination statutes that is consistent with good policy
and Congress's intent-an interpretation not possible under current
standards.
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INTRODUCTION

Standards of causation in antidiscrimination law, and disparatetreatment cases in particular, are deeply flawed. They can be described, in the
words of Dr. Seuss, as a "muddled duddled fuddled wuddled fox in socks."1
That's a metaphor for causation doctrine that entails not only a tangled web
of inconsistent rules and conditions but also causal standards that are not
quite right in the first instance. The problem stems from the inadequacies
associated with current standards of causation in disparate-treatment cases
-the "but-for" test and the "motivating-factor" test.
Causation is the element of a legal claim that connects a defendant's
misconduct to a plaintiff's injury.2 As the Supreme Court has stated, "When
the law grants persons the right to compensation for injury from wrongful
conduct, there must be some demonstrated connection, some link, between
the injury sustained and the wrong alleged. The requisite relation between
prohibited conduct and compensable injury is governed by the principles of
causation ... ."3
The most basic and pervasive standard of causation in the law is the butfor standard.4 It asks whether the outcome would have occurred in the
absence of the alleged conduct.5 The defendant's conduct is a but-for cause
of the plaintiff's harm if, in the absence of the alleged conduct, the plaintiff's
harm would not have occurred. 6 The but-for test is generally simple and
provides a straightforward method for determining actual cause and effect.7
It is based on the "necessity condition"-on whether the defendant's conduct
"made a difference."
In disparate-treatment cases, however, the but-for test is frequently
inadequate as a standard of causation. This is because most disparatetreatment cases involve allegations of at least two possible factors (or "mixed
motives") leading to an adverse employment action-one illegitimate (i.e.,
discriminatory) and one legitimate. 8 This occurs for two reasons. First,
employment decisions, such as whom to hire, fire, or promote, or how much
to pay an employee, are complex, often involving multiple factors. Second, it

1.

DR. SEUSS, FOX IN SOCKS 59 (1993).

2.
Coincast Corp. v. Nat'l Ass'n of Afr. Am.-Owned Media, 140 S. Ct. 1009, 1013 (2020);
Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 342 (2013).
3.

Nassar, 570 U.S. at 342.

4.

DAN B. DOBBS, PAUL T. HAYDEN & ELLEN M. BUBLICK, HORNBOOK ON TORTS 317 (2d ed.

2016).

5.

Id.

6.

Id.

7.
Throughout this Article, I use the terms "cause and effect" or "causal" effect to refer to
the generic causal concept, "causation" to refer to the legal causal concept, and "causality" or
"causal inference" to refer to the scientific or statistical causal concept.
8.

See BARBARA T. LINDEMANN, PAUL GROSSMAN & C. GEOFFREY WEIRICH, EMPLOYMENT

DISCRIMINATION LAw 2-2-3 ( 5 th ed. 2o12).
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is difficult to ascertain an employer's true motive, and, therefore, an employer
can easily rebut an allegation of discrimination by presenting evidence of a
legitimate purpose.
Disparate-treatment cases, and mixed-motive cases in particular, can
often fail to satisfy the but-for standard of causation since, even in the absence
of the discriminatory factor, the legitimate factor would be sufficient for the
adverse employment action. Consider, for example, circumstances in which
an employer promoted a male employee over a female employee named Lisa,
leading to allegations of unlawful discrimination based on sex. Assume there
is strong evidence that (1) the employer held the general view that male
employees are more capable than female employees and looked specifically
to promote a male employee, but (2) Lisa was, incidentally, far less qualified
for the position than was her male colleague. Employing the but-for standard
would result in a finding of no causation and therefore no liability because
even in the absence of the discriminatory conduct, the employer would not
have hired Lisa for the position.
Courts and legislatures have struggled immensely with this result for at
least two reasons. First, based on common intuition regarding cause and
effect, it is near-universally recognized that, if a factor is sufficient and
necessary to bring about an outcome on its own, then it is a cause of the
outcome even if other factors would themselves be sufficient to bring about
the same outcome. Second, allowing discriminatory employers to avoid
liability by identifying a legitimate factor (whether pretextual or not) is
arguably contrary to the deterrence objectives of antidiscrimination law.
Moreover, the question of motive is rarely straightforward evidentiarily, and
the problem of defining causation in mixed-motive cases is closely tied to
difficulties in ascertaining an employer's true purpose and the ease with
which an employer can contrive a legitimate explanation for an adverse
employment action.
As a result of the inadequacy of the but-for test in disparate-treatment
cases, courts and legislatures have frequently sought to replace the but-for test
with the motivating-factor test, which simply requires that discrimination with
respect to a protected characteristic somehow motivated an adverse employment
action, whether the discriminatory factor actually made a difference or not.9
This test is, however, inadequate as a replacement for the but-for standard. It
does not (and is not intended to) reflect actual cause and effect. Its meaning
is vague, and it simply allows a factfinder to rely on intuition to determine
whether an employer should be held liable for the adverse employment
decision based on evidence of discrimination, regardless of whether a causal
link has been established.

9.

Id. at 2-112-14.
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Courts and legislatures therefore choose between two inadequate
causation standards. Consequently, disparate-treatment doctrine, frequently
analogized to "a swamp,"o has become increasingly chaotic-rife with
complexities, inconsistencies, and ambiguities-as courts have applied varied
approaches to counteract these inadequacies in order to arrive at desirable
case outcomes. For example, courts apply one standard to actions under Title
VII, for discrimination based on "race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin,""1 a different standard to actions under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA), for discrimination based on age,12 and under Title
VII's retaliation provision, for retaliation against an employee who challenged
discrimination,13 and a mix of standards to actions under the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA), for discrimination based on disability. 14 Moreover, the
various standards entail a complex web of intricacies that reflect the
inadequacies of the causation measures that courts apply.
In this Article, I introduce a causal framework that returns logic and
clarity to the disparate-treatment analysis. This framework, which I call the
"factorial" framework,15 provides a straightforward method for determining
causation in disparate-treatment cases, and one that fulfills the policy
objectives of antidiscrimination law. As importantly, it provides a theory of
causation that is firmly grounded in the actual, common, and scientific notion
of cause and effect, and that permits a more seamless relationship between
standardsof causation and proof of causation.
Employing the factorial framework as an underlying theory of causation
leads to three important innovations over current approaches to determining
causation in disparate-treatment cases. First, the framework imports a
counterfactual model of cause and effect and its conceptual building blocks
from the "potential-outcomes" model (also known as the "Rubin Causal
Model"), a predominant model for asking and answering questions of cause
and effect in statistics and the sciences. In particular, the factorial framework
places the but-for test within this broader counterfactual model, the broader
reasoning on which it is based. This is crucial for understanding and applying
causal measures, or "estimands," that are broader than the but-for measure
but retain its fundamental feature-the necessity condition. As such, it is also
fundamental to a more appropriate causal estimand in disparate-treatment

10.
MartinJ. Katz, UnifyingDisparateTreatment (Really), 59 HASTINGS L.J. 643, 645 n.8 (2008)
("Courts and commentators have routinely referred to current disparate treatment doctrine as a
'swamp,' a 'morass,' and a 'quagmire."' (citing Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc., egg F.3 d 838, 851
-53 ( 9 th Cir. 2002), aff'd, 539 U.S. 90 (2003), and other sources)).

2 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2018).

it.

4

12.

29 U.S.C. § 623 (2018).

13.

42 U.S.C.

§ 2000e-3-

§ 12112.
SeeHillelJ. Bavli, CounterfactualCausation, 51 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 879, go4 (2og) [hereinafter
CounterfactualCausation].

14.

15.

42 U.S.C.

IOWA LAW REVIEW

488

[Vol. 10o6:483

cases. Moreover, the potential-outcomes model provides building blocks of
causal inference that refine the causal question and simplify concepts that
have caused substantial confusion in these cases. It also facilitates a causal
inquiry that permits a stronger link between the law's measure of causation
and proof thereof. The potential-outcomes model enables a factfinder to
better conceptualize the causal problem, and, specifically, the inferences
required for determining causation. This is especially useful in discrimination
cases, in which a complex set of factors may underlie an adverse employment
decision.
Second, the factorial framework applies the NESS (Necessary Element of
a Sufficient Set) test as the broader causal estimand appropriate in disparatetreatment cases. This test is based on the notion of a "causal set," which can
be understood as a set of factors that together lead to the occurrence of an
outcome. 6 It is satisfied if a factor "was necessary for the sufficiency of a set of
existing antecedent conditions that was sufficient for the occurrence of the
consequence."17 A particular and simplified version of this test has been
adopted by the Restatement (Third) of Torts as a test for causation in
situations involving multiple sufficient causes (msc). It provides that, "[i]f
multiple acts occur, each of which under § 26 [Factual Cause] alone would
have been a factual cause of the physical harm at the same time in the absence
of the other act(s), each act is regarded as a factual cause of the harm."'
As I will argue, in addition to reflecting the actual, common, and
scientific notion of cause and effect, the NESS test simplifies the causal
inquiry in disparate-treatment cases and fulfills the policy objectives of
antidiscrimination law. In applying NESS as the causal estimand-the
measure of interest-in these cases, the factorial framework can be
understood as refining and unifying the but-for and motivating-factor tests of
causation. Indeed, the factorial framework treats the NESS test as a middleground approach that retains the essential element of the but-for test-that,
in line with common, scientific, and philosophic notions of cause and effect,
the misconduct "made a difference," or, in some sense, satisfied the necessity
condition-while capturing the essential purpose of the motivating-factor

16.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 26 crt.
c
(AM. L. INST. 2010) ("A useful model for understanding factual causation is to conceive of a set
made up of each of the necessary conditions for the plaintiffs harm. Absent any one of the
elements of the set, the plaintiff's harm would not have occurred."); id. § 27 cmt. f (explaining
the "multiple-sufficient-causal-set situation"); see alsoJune v. Union Carbide Corp., 577 F. d 1234,
3
1242-44 (ioth Cir. 2009); infra Section III.E.

17.
Richard W. Wright, The Grounds and Extent of Legal Responsibility, 40 SAN DIEGO L. REv.
1425, 1441 (2003) [hereinafter Wright, Grounds and Extent]; Richard W. Wright, Once More into
the Bramble Bush: Duty, Causal Contribution, and the Extent of Legal Responsibility, 54 VAND. L. REV.
1071, 1 10 2-03 (2001) [hereinafter Wright, Once More into the BrambleBush].
18.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM

L. INST. 2010).

§

27 (AM.
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test-to hold an employer responsible for discrimination that "motivated" an
adverse employment action, even if it was accompanied by sufficient
legitimate motivating factors. Importantly, however, the factorial framework
should not be understood as a compromise approach; rather, I argue that it
refines existing tests and more accurately captures the notion of actual cause
and effect than either test does individually.
Third, the factorial framework can be applied simply and
straightforwardly using basic torts principles. I treat mixed-motive disparatetreatment cases as a special type of msc torts situation, a well-studied situation
in which two or more forces contribute to an outcome where each force alone
would be sufficient to produce the same outcome.19 Additionally, I apply basic
torts principles for establishing a prima facie claim and satisfying burdens of
production and persuasion. The refinements allowed by the factorial
framework's application of the potential-outcomes model and the NESS test
obviate the need for complicated burden-shifting rules and other overly
complex features of current proof schemes. Instead, simple torts principles
involving proof of a wrong, a harm, and a causal link between the wrong and
the harm suffice.
The factorial framework carries a wide range of implications for
antidiscrimination law. In this Article, I discuss two sets of implications in
particular: implications for the policy objectives of antidiscrimination law and
implications for judicial interpretation of causal language in antidiscrimination
statutes. I argue that, in addition to reflecting actual cause and effect, the
proposed approach promotes antidiscrimination law's deterrence objectives
while preventing windfall recoveries and their distorting effects on incentives.
It also allows an interpretation of causal language in antidiscrimination
statutes that is consistent with good policy and Congress's intent-an
interpretation not possible under current standards.
In Part II, I provide an overview of causation doctrine surrounding
mixed-motive disparate-treatment cases. I discuss the inconsistent and
inadequate standards governing these cases and their relationship to msc
situations in tort law. In Part III, I introduce fundamental theory and concepts
underlying the factorial framework and their applicability in disparatetreatment cases. Among other things, I introduce the potential-outcomes
model and apply it to explain how the factorial framework refines both the
but-for test and the motivating-factor test, and why NESS is an ideal causal
estimand in disparate-treatment cases. In Part IV, I show how the factorial
framework would apply in practice in disparate-treatment cases. I provide
illustrations and show how the factorial framework could simplify and

1g.

See id.; W. PAGE KEETON, DAN B. DOBBS, ROBERT E. KEETON & DAVID G. OWEN, PROSSER

§ 41, at 266 ( 5 th ed. 1984) ("[T] here is one type of situation
in which [the but-for test] fails. If two causes concur to bring about an event, and either one of
them, operating alone, would have been sufficient to cause the identical result, some other test
is needed.").
AND KEETON ON THE LAw OF TORTS
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improve the disparate-treatment analysis. In Part V, I discuss implications for
the policy aims of antidiscrimination law and for interpreting causal language
in antidiscrimination statutes. In Part VI, I conclude.
II.

CAUSATION IN DISPARATE-TREATMENT CASES

A.

SCRAMBLING FOR A LOGICAL CAUSAL STANDARD

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination against
an individual "because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin."

In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,

sixJustices agreed-though

not in a majority opinion-on a burden-shifting framework in which, first, a
plaintiff alleging discrimination would "show that one of the prohibited traits
was a 'motivating' or 'substantial' factor in the employer's decision," and,
second, if the plaintiff satisfied her burden, "the burden of persuasion would
shift to the employer, which could escape liability if it could prove that it
would have taken the same employment action in the absence of all
discriminatory animus"-i.e., that discrimination was not a but-for cause of
the adverse employment action.22 According to the plurality opinion in Price
Waterhouse
We need not leave our common sense at the doorstep when we

interpret a statute. It is difficult for us to imagine that, in the simple
words "because of," Congress meant to obligate a plaintiff to identify
the precise causal role played by legitimate and illegitimate
motivations in the employment decision she challenges. We
conclude, instead, that Congress meant to obligate her to prove that
the employer relied upon sex-based considerations in coming to its
decision.23
The opinion, however, emphasized that the "preservation of an employer's
remaining freedom of choice"-the
"maintenance of employer
prerogatives"-"is evident from the statute itself and from its history, both in
Congress and in this Court."24 The Court concluded, therefore, that "an
employer shall not be liable if it can prove that, even if it had not taken [the
prohibited trait] into account, it would have come to the same decision
regarding a particular person."25

20.

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2018).

21.

Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).

22.
Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 348 (2013) (citing Price Waterhouse,
490 U.S. at 258 (plurality opinion); id. at 259-60 (White, J., concurring); id. at 276-77
(O'Connor, J., concurring)).
23.

Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 241-42 (plurality opinion).

24.

Id. at 242.

25.

Id.
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The method that emerged from Price Waterhouse was based on the
Supreme Court's decision in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,26 a case
frequently understood as the starting point of the law's current proof scheme
in Title VII cases. In McDonnellDouglas, the Court held that a Title VII plaintiff
may establish a prima facie discrimination claim
by showing (i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he
applied and was qualified for a job for which the employer was
seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was
rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position remained
open and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons
of complainant's qualifications.27
This test has appeared in various forms since McDonnellDouglas; however,
[r] egardless of the form of the prima facie case ... if the plaintiff is
relying on the McDonnellDouglasmethodology, he generally must in
some way prove four elements: (1) membership in a protected class;
(2) qualification for the job; (3) an adverse employment action; and
(4) a causal connection between the adverse action and protected
classification.28
If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie discrimination claim, under
McDonnellDouglas, "[t]he burden then must shift to the employer to articulate
some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejection."29 At
that point, however, the plaintiff is given "a fair opportunity to show that [the
employer's] stated reason for [the plaintiffs] rejection was in fact pretext,"
meaning "that the presumptively valid reasons for his rejection were in fact a
coverup for a racially discriminatory decision."3o
Notably, McDonnell Douglas and its progeny require only weak
circumstantial evidence of causation to establish a prima facie case.3 1 Once
this standard has been met, the burden shifts to the defendant to prove that
discriminatory conduct is not the but-for cause of the alleged adverse
employment action.32 This proof scheme may reflect, on the one hand, the
Court's understanding of Title VII as requiring a but-for standard of causation
and, on the other hand, the Court's realization that requiring a plaintiff to

26.
27.

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
Id. at 802.

28.

LINDEMANN ET AL., supranote 8, at 2-13.

29.

McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.

30.

Id. at 804-05.

31.
32.

See id. at 802.
Id.
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prove but-for causation to establish a prima facie claim would be
impracticable and would defeat the statute's objectives.33
Finally, because employment decisions are complex, and it is often
feasible for an employer to contrive a legitimate purpose for an adverse
employment decision, once the employer has proved such a purpose, the
plaintiff is then given the opportunity to show that the legitimate reason
provided by the employer is in fact pretextual.34 Evidence showing that the
employer's reason is pretextual can consist of "direct" evidence, such as
discriminatory comments by an employer, as well as statistical evidence and
evidence showing that similarly-situated employees without the protected
feature were treated more favorably than the plaintiff.35
In 1991, two years after Price Waterhouse, Congress amended Title VII.3 6 It
"codified the burden-shifting and lessened causation framework of Price
Waterhouse in part but also rejected it to a substantial degree."37 The
amendment added a subsection providing that "an unlawful employment
practice is established when the complaining party demonstrates that race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any
employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the
practice."3 8 However, it replaced the Court's burden-shifting framework with
a new one that allowed an employer to avoid "damages or ... an order
requiring any admission, reinstatement, hiring, promotion, or payment" if it
proved that the illegitimate motivating factor was not a but-for cause of the
adverse employment action, but did not allow the employer to avoid
"declaratory relief, injunctive relief ... , and [certain] attorney's fees and
costs" with such a showing.39 Therefore, pursuant to Title VII, courts apply a
version of the proof scheme applied in McDonnellDouglasand Price Waterhouse,
but with the remedial framework outlined in its 1991 amendments.
The Supreme Court again addressed "the meaning of 'because' and the
problem of causation"41 in 2oog, in Gross v. FBL FinancialServices, Inc.41 Gross
involved the ADEA, which prohibits discrimination against an individual
"because of such individual's age."42 According to the Court, "[t] he words
'because of mean 'by reason of: on account of" and, therefore, "the ordinary
meaning of the ADEA's requirement that an employer took adverse action

33.
34.

See infra Section IIB; McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 800-06.
McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804-05.

35.
36.

See LINDEMANN ET AL., supranote 8, at 2-50-102.
Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 348 (2013).

37.
38.

Id.
4 2 U.S.C. § 2000e-2((m) (2018).

39.

Id. § 20ooe-5(g) (2) (B); see Nassar, 570 U.S. at 348-49.

40.

Nassar, 570 U.S. at 349.

41.

Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc.,

42.

29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (2018).

557

U.S. 167 (2009).
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'because of age is that age was the 'reason' that the employer decided to
act."43 The Court held that "[t] o establish a disparate-treatment claim under
the plain language of the ADEA, therefore, a plaintiff must prove that age was
the 'but-for' cause of the employer's adverse decision."44 The Court explicitly
rejected the application of Title VII's burden-shifting framework to prove
causation under the ADEA, holding "that under @ 623(a)(1), the plaintiff
retains the burden of persuasion to establish that age was the 'but-for' cause
of the employer's adverse action."45 It reasoned that the ADEA, unlike Title
VII, does not provide for the motivating-factor test, highlighting that
"Congress neglected to add such a provision to the ADEA when it amended
Title VII ... even though it contemporaneously amended the ADEA in several
ways."4 6
In 2013, the Supreme Court, in University of Texas Southwestern Medical
Center v. Nassar,47 revisited the issue of causation under Title VII, but this time
under Title VII's antiretaliation provision, which prohibits discrimination
against an individual "because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful
employment practice by this subchapter, or because he has made a charge,
testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation,
proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter."4 8 The Court again interpreted
the term "because" to imply a but-for standard. It held that, "[g]iven the lack
of any meaningful textual difference between the text in this statute and the

one in Gross, the proper conclusion here, as in Gross, is that Title VII
retaliation claims require proof that the desire to retaliate was the but-for
cause of the challenged employment action."49
Finally, as in Title VII and the ADEA, the ADA uses language that gives
rise to complex issues of causation in mixed-motive cases. The statute
prohibits discrimination against "individual[s] on the basis of disability in
regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge
of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms,
conditions, and privileges of employment."50 As with other antidiscrimination
statutes, there is little stability or consistency when it comes to the standard of
causation in mixed-motive ADA claims. For example, some circuits apply the
but-for test, thus precluding liability when an illegitimate factor is
accompanied by sufficient legitimate factors, while others apply the

43.

Gross, 557 U.S. at 176 (quoting

I

WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY

194 (1966)).
Id.
44.
45.
Id. at 177.
46.
Id. at 174.
47.

Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338 (2013).

48.

42 U.S.C.

49.

Nassar, 570 U.S. at 352; see CounterfactualCausation, supra note 15, at 927-30.

50.

42 U.S.C.

§ 2000e-3(a)
§

12112 (a).

(2018).
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motivating-factor test, which allows a plaintiff to establish a claim even when
the discriminatory factor is not a but-for cause of the adverse decision.51
In summary, causal standards in antidiscrimination law consist of a
complex maze of rules and conditions rife with inconsistencies, both within
and across discrimination statutes, and within and across jurisdictions.
Moreover, as I will argue, the tortuous routes through this maze lead only to
vague and unsuitable causal measures. Indeed, the "swamp" that describes the
current state of the law surrounding causation in these cases has likely grown
from the inadequacy of these measures.
B.

THE UNDERLYING PROBLEM: MIXED-MOTIVE CASES AS
MULTIPLE-SUFFICIENT-CAUSE SITUATIONS

Inconsistency in standards surrounding disparate-treatment cases is only
a symptom of a larger underlying problem. The source of the inconsistency is
the inadequacy of the but-for and motivating-factor tests of causation.
A mixed-motive case is a type of multiple-sufficient-cause (msc) situation.
This situation arises when at least two forces contribute to an outcome and
each alone would have produced the same outcome. For example, consider a
hypothetical case involving two fires, each negligently and independently
started, that combine to burn down a lodge, where each fire alone would be
sufficient to destroy the lodge-even in the absence of the other fire.52 These
fires are called concurrent multiple sufficient causes because they occurred
concurrently with respect to the harm.53 A variant of this problem is one in
which one fire arrives at the lodge immediately after the first fire burned the
lodge down. The fires in this circumstance are called successive multiple
sufficient causes because they occurred successively with respect to the
harm.54 Concurrent and successive msc situations are also known as
"duplicative" and "preemptive" causation problems.55 In this Section, I focus
on concurrent msc situations; I turn to the issue of successive msc situations
in later sections of the Article.
A mixed-motive case is a special type of msc situation because, like the
general case, it involves at least two factors, at least one legitimate factor and
one discriminatory factor, that contribute to an outcome-an adverse

51.
See LINDEMANN ET AL., supra note 8, at 13-197-99 (discussing variation in standards
across circuits and over time, and citing cases).
52.
See generally Kingston v. Chi. & N.W. Ry. Co., 211 N.W. 913 (Wis. 1927) (involving "two
separate, independent, and distinct [fires], each of which constituted the proximate cause of
plaintiffs damage, and either of which, in the absence of the other, would have accomplished
such result"); DOBBS ET AL., supra note 4, at 321.
See generally WARD FARNSWORTH & MARK F. GRADY, TORTS: CASES AND QUESTIONS 293
53.
( 3 d ed. 2o19) (discussing msc situations).
54.

See generally id. (using the term "subsequent").

55.

See Richard W. Wright, Causationin Tort Law, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1735, 1775-77 (1985).
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employment action-where each alone would be sufficient to produce the
same outcome.5 6 Consider, for example, a case involving a racist employer
who rejected the employment application of an African-American applicant,
the plaintiff, based on the employer's preference for white workers. At the
same time that the plaintiff was applying for the position, a white candidate
also applied. Incidentally, this white applicant had been training for this
position for years and was better qualified for it. Regardless of who else
applied for the position-white or not-it is clear that the employer would
likely have hired this applicant over the plaintiff. There are two forces that
prevented the employer from hiring the African-American applicant: the
employer's discriminatory treatment and the qualifications of the AfricanAmerican applicant relative to those of the white applicant. Each force was
sufficient on its own to prevent the plaintiffs hire.
As in the general msc problem, neither factor in the mixed-motive case

is a but-for cause of the harm under the traditional but-for test because even
in the absence of the employer's discriminatory hiring process, the AfricanAmerican applicant would not have been hired. The discrimination, in a
certain sense, made no difference at all with respect to the outcome of the
hiring process since the employer would have hired the highly qualified
candidate over other candidates, regardless of their race.
To be sure, mixed-motive cases are arguably unique in an important
respect relative to the general class of msc situations: they often involve
circumstances in which at least one of the two or more forces sufficient for
the adverse employment action is due to either "nature" or non-protected
features or behavior of the plaintiff, rather than a third-party source of
misconduct.57 For example, in the illustration above, the application of the
highly qualified white candidate was a sufficient factor, but one arising from
nature rather than another individual's misconduct. Other examples of
factors that are due to either nature or a plaintiffs own non-protected features
or behavior are: an employer's decision to shut down a business; the plaintiff's
own poor qualifications for a position; the plaintiffs poor performance or
rudeness to customers; and a downturn in the economy causing an employer
to reduce her staff or to hire fewer employees.

56. See Counterfactual Causation, supra note 15, at 882-83, 927-32 (treating mixed-motive
discrimination cases as a particular type of multiple-sufficient-cause situation); Andrew Verstein,
The Failure ofMixed-Motives furisprudence, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 725, 742-54, 755 (2o1) (challenging
"rationales sometimes given for incorporating causation into a mixed-motives standard" and
arguing that, even "[i]f we analogize a defendant's motives as potential causes of the action, then
mixed motives are analogous to torts with multiple causes").
57. Some scholars have questioned whether motives should be understood as causes or
assessed with respect to causation in the first instance. SeeVerstein, supra note 56, at 742-46. This
Article accepts as a premise Congress's and the Supreme Court's treatment of motives as forces
that qualify to be causes of an outcome and that are subject to principles of causation. See supra
Section IIA.
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However, this feature of mixed-motive cases is not necessarily distinct
from the general msc situation and, in any event, should not have a substantial
impact on our analysis, except to highlight that an appropriate standard of
causation must account for concerns regarding behavioral effects broader
than simply deterring discriminatory conduct. In particular, it must account
for behavioral effects associated with inappropriate findings of liability and
windfall recoveries.
Msc situations, like mixed-motive cases in particular, involve at least one
factor arising from misconduct (e.g., a negligently started fire or a discriminatory
purpose), but involve other sufficient factors that can arise from either thirdparty misconduct (e.g., a second negligently started fire), natural forces (a
second fire arising from a lightning strike and dry conditions), or the
plaintiffs own (non-protected) features or misconduct (e.g., a second fire
arising from the plaintiff's negligence). While mixed-motive cases could arise
from two separate sources of discriminatory conduct, they usually arise within
one of the latter two categories in particular-meaning, they ordinarily
involve sufficient forces that arise from nature or the plaintiffs own nonprotected features or behavior. This is arguably significant because courts
deciding torts cases have sometimes treated the latter two categories of msc
situations differently than the first category. Some courts-such as the
Supreme Court of Wisconsin in the famous Kingston case-have held that,
although a plaintiff can recover in a msc situation even though the
defendant's misconduct is not a but-for cause of the harm, a defense to this
general rule is that the other sufficient force was due to nature rather than
another's misconduct.5 8 Similarly, where a msc situation involves the
plaintiff's own misconduct as a sufficient factor, the plaintiffs recovery may
be foreclosed by rules of contributory or comparative negligence.59
However, although the classic two-fire problem arises from the
misconduct of two independent parties, many msc situations outside of the
mixed-motive context involve "natural" or "contributory" factors. It is true that
a drag racer who sues another drag racer for negligence, where each drag
racer's reckless behavior is deemed to be sufficient for the occurrence of the
harm, is far different than an applicant who sues for discrimination even
though his qualifications for the position were substantially worse than those
expected for the position. One can argue that it is, in a sense, the applicant's
"fault" that he is not a better applicant; but even if the applicant's
qualifications can be described as his "fault," this meaning of fault is certainly
different than in the drag racing context.

58.
Kingston v. Chi. & N.W. Ry. Co., 211 N.W. 913, 914-15 (Wis. 1927) ("From our present
consideration of the subject, we are not disposed to criticise [sic] the doctrine which exempts
from liability a wrongdoer who sets a fire which unites with a fire originating from natural causes,
such as lighting, not attributable to any human agency, resulting in damage.").
59.

See generally DOBBS ET AL., supranote

4,

at 379-408 (discussing plaintiff misconduct).
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analogous to this mixed-motive scenario. Consider, for example, a case in
which it is alleged that a defendant tortiously exposed a plaintiff to a toxin
that caused the plaintiff to suffer from a certain illness, but where other
factors, such as genetics or other exposures that were not necessarily the
"fault" of the plaintiff, may also have been sufficient to bring about the same
illness. Similarly, in other mixed-motive cases, a non-discriminatory factor may
be more analogous to a contributory-negligence scenario-for example, in
cases in which an employee is fired for drinking on the job, regularly arriving
late to work, or assaulting a customer.
Suffice it to say, a non-discriminatory factor in a mixed-motive case can
arise from natural sources, third-party sources, or from the plaintiffs own
non-protected features or behavior. This is true of the general msc situation
as well. Even if the mixed-motive context can be said to have a higher
proportion of cases that involve natural sources or the plaintiffs own nonprotected features or behavior, the mixed-motive context invokes similar
concerns as the general msc context, except perhaps with special
consideration for socially undesirable incentives that can arise from windfall
recoveries and inappropriate findings of liability. Let us, therefore, consider
the causal standards that courts have applied in msc situations as they pertain
to the mixed-motive context.
Msc situations have given rise to widespread confusion and controversy
surrounding the appropriate standard of causation in a broad range of
areas. 60 In the concurrent msc situation, neither factor is a but-for cause of
the harm. In the two-fire problem, for example, neither fire is a but-for cause
of the lodge's destruction since, absent either fire, the same damage would
have occurred as a result of the other fire.6 As a leading treatise states, "The
but-for test in such cases leads to a result that is almost always condemned as
violating both an intuitive sense of causation and good legal policy." 6 2 While
the traditional but-for test leads to the conclusion that neither fire in the twofire problem is a cause of the lodge's destruction, "[o]ur senses have told us
that [the defendant] did participate.... In the language of the layman, the
defendant's fire 'had something to do with' the burning of plaintiffs
property." 63 As one author has commented, in msc situations, "the but-for test
denies the existence of cause in fact while everything in human experience
and intuition cries out that cause in fact was present." 64

6o.

See CounterfactualCausation, supra note 15, at 884-93.

61.

See DOBBS ET AL., supra note 4, at 321.

62.

Id. at

63.

Wex S. Malone, Ruminations on Cause-in-Fact,9 STAN. L. REV. 6o, 89 (1956).

64.

David W. Robertson, The Common Sense of Cause in Fact, 75 TEX. L. REv. 1765, 1777 (1997).

3

21-22.
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Courts and scholars have therefore almost universally declared that the
counterfactual model of causation, and the but-for test in particular, fails in
msc situations. 65 Courts have abandoned the but-for test in msc situations, and
the asserted failure of the counterfactual model in these situations has led to
calls to abandon it as a general model of causation. 66
In msc situations, courts have generally followed the Restatement
(Second) of Torts and replaced the but-for test with the "substantial-factor"
test, which is a general version of the motivating-factor test.6 7 The substantialfactor test asks simply whether the misconduct at issue was "a substantial factor
in bringing about the [plaintiff's] harm." 68 The standard does not invoke (and
is not intended to invoke) any analytical reasoning derived from models of
actual cause and effect; rather, it relies on the intuition of the factfinder to
arrive at a determination regarding factual causation. For this reason, it has
been said that "[t]he substantial factor test is not so much a test as an
incantation." 69 In particular, the substantial-factor test, like the motivatingfactor test,
points neither to any reasoning nor to any facts that will assist courts
or lawyers in resolving the question of causation. Put differently, the
substantial factor test requires no particular mental operation. It
invites the jury's intuition. In one view, that represents a loss of
precision in analysis with no corresponding gain.70
In contrast with the substantial-factor test, the but-for test of causation
reflects notions of cause and effect in philosophy and the sciences, as well as
the meaning of cause and effect as commonly used.71 It also provides a

65.

See DOBBS ET AL., supranote 4, at 321-22; KEETON ET AL., supra note 19,

§ 41,

at 266.

66.
Counterfactual Causation, supra note 15, at 882; see, e.g., Mitchell v. Gonzales, 819 P.2d
872, 876 (Cal. 1991) (rejecting the but-for test in favor of the substantial-factor test in msc
situations); MICHAEL S. MOORE, CAUSATION AND RESPONSIBILITY: AN ESSAY IN LAW, MORALS, AND

METAPHYSICS 411 (2009).
67.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 431 (AM. L. INST. 1965); see Burrage v. United
States, 571 U.S. 204, 215-16 (2014) ("One prominent authority on tort law asserts that 'a
broader rule . . . has found general acceptance: The defendant's conduct is a cause of the event
if it was a material element and a substantial factor in bringing it about."' (quoting KEETON ET
AL., supra note 19, § 41, at 267)).
68.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 431 (AM. L. INST. 1965).

69.

DOBBS ET AL., supra note 4, at 323.
Id.

70.

71.
See Barrage, 571 U.S. at 210-14; Paroline v. United States, 572 U.S. 434, 452 (2014)
(referring to alternatives to the but-for test as "a kind of legal fiction or construct"); Gross v. FBL
Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 176-78 (2oog) (holding that "the ordinary meaning of the ADEA's
requirement that an employer took adverse action 'because of age is that the age was the 'reason'
that the employer decided to act," and that this implies that, "under the plain language of the
ADEA ... a plaintiff must prove that age was the 'but-for' cause of the employer's adverse
decision"); see also CounterfactualCausation, supra note 15, at 88o n.1, 884-85; DOBBS ET AL., supra
note 4, at 314.
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straightforward analytical process for the factfinder to employ to arrive at a
determination regarding causation. But, as the discussion above indicates, it
leads-somewhat paradoxically-to incorrect results in msc situations:
"despite the seemingly sound and well-accepted reasoning of the
counterfactual model, and the but-for standard in particular, applying this
reasoning leads to a seemingly illogical conclusion."72 Relatedly, the but-for
test leads to results in msc situations that are commonly recognized as
contrary to the deterrence and fairness objectives of tort law.73
In the mixed-motive context, the but-for test and the motivating-factor

test give rise to the same concerns as in the general msc situation. The but-for
test yields results that are counter to our common intuition regarding cause
and effect and that are contrary to the deterrence and fairness objectives of
antidiscrimination law.74 For example, if an employer fires an employee
because he is African American, intuition regarding cause and effect, as well
as good policy, would prevent the employer from defending his conduct on
the grounds that he would have fired the employee anyway.75
As in other msc contexts, therefore, courts and lawmakers have sought to
replace the but-for test in disparate-treatment cases with an alternative test.

They have turned to the motivating-factor test, a variation of the substantialfactor test adapted for the antidiscrimination context.7 6
However, the motivating-factor test is subject to the same criticisms as the
substantial-factor test. It does not reflect actual cause and effect.77 It relies on

72.

CounterfactualCausation, supra note 15, at 885.

73.
74.

DOBBS ET AL., supra note 4, at 321-22.

See infra Section V.A.

See infra Section V.A.
75.
76.
See, e.g., Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977)
("Initially, in this case, the burden was properly placed upon respondent to show that his conduct
was constitutionally protected, and that this conduct was a 'substantial factor' or to put it in other
words, that it was a 'motivating factor' in the Board's decision not to rehire him." (footnote
omitted)); see also Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 259 (1989) (White,J., concurring)
("And here, as in Mt. Healthy, and as the Court now holds, Hopkins was not required to prove
that the illegitimate factor was the only, principal, or true reason for petitioner's action. Rather,
...
her burden was to show that the unlawful motive was a substantial factor in the adverse
employment action."); id. at 280 (Kennedy,J., dissenting) ("The shift in the burden of persuasion
occurs only where a plaintiff proves by direct evidence that an unlawful motive was a substantial
factor actually relied upon in making the decision.").
See Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 342 (2013) ("When the law
77.
grants persons the right to compensation for injury from wrongful conduct, there must be some
demonstrated connection, some link, between the injury sustained and the wrong alleged. The
requisite relation between prohibited conduct and compensable injury is governed by the
principles of causation .... "); James E. Viator, When Cause-in-Fact is More than a Fact: The
Malone-Green Debate on the Role of Policy in DeterminingFactualCausation in Tort Law, 44 LA. L. REV.
1519, 1526-27 (1984) ("A common belief ... is that policy considerations have no role to play
in the determination of cause-in-fact, 'because no policy can be strong enough to warrant the
imposition of liability for loss to which the defendant's conduct has not in fact contributed."'
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intuition rather than providing a factfinder with particular direction or an
analytical process by which to arrive at a causal determination.78 And, because
it relies on intuition, it produces unpredictability in an area of the law in
which such unpredictability may have significant negative consequences on
employer and employee behavior, in addition to increasing litigation costs.79
For these reasons, courts and lawmakers have been reluctant to apply the
motivating-factor test in mixed-motive cases. A central idea in tort law, of
which antidiscrimination law is a special type,"o is that defendants should be
held responsible to pay only for damage that they caused.>1 But courts and
lawmakers understand that employing the motivating-factor test means
allowing juries to impose liability and damages based on intuition regarding
who should be held responsible for the harm that has occurred, without a
finding of causation-at least in the common or scientific meaning of the
term.8 2 Moreover, for reasons described in detail below, there is ajustifiable
fear of overdeterrence and other harmful effects that could result from
allowing jurors to decide liability based on a loose and poorly defined
standard.8 3
Courts and lawmakers have thus struggled to decide between two
inadequate standards of causation in disparate-treatment cases-as they have
in other msc situations. They have sought to retain a rigorous standard that
reflects actual cause and effect while, at the same time, departing from such a
standard, the but-for standard, for purposes of achieving desired outcomes in

(quoting JOHN G. FLEMING, THE LAW OF TORTS 170 (6th ed. 1983))). The tradition of requiring
causation, as currently defined, is largely grounded in theories of fairness. But, while some
scholars have commented that causation is not necessary for optimal deterrence, few deny that
causation, in at least some meaningful sense, is necessary for proper levels of deterrence. See
generally WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 229
(i98 7 ); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Causation in Tort Law: An Economic Approach, 12
J. LEGAL STUD. 1og (1983); Steven Shavell, An Analysis of Causation and the Scope of Liability in the
Law of Torts, 9J. LEGAL STUD. 463 (1 980); Guido Calabresi, ConcerningCause and the Law of Torts:
An Essay for Harry Kalven, Jr., 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 69 (1975).
78.
DOBBS ET AL., supra note 4, at 323; see also Richard W. Wright & Ingeborg Puppe,
Causation:Linguistic, Philosophical,Legal and Economic, 91 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 461, 474,480-8i (2016).
79.

As suggested in the Restatement (Third), the substantial-factor test "has proved

confusing and been misused." RESTATEMENT
EMOTIONAL HARM

§

(THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND

26 cmt. j (AM. L. INST. 2010).

8o.
See Nassa, 570 U.S. at 347 (referring explicitly to tort law in determining the standard
of causation applicable in a Title VII retaliation claim, and indicating that this "is the background
against which Congress legislated in enacting Title VII, and these are the default rules it is
presumed to have incorporated, absent an indication to the contrary in the statute itself').
81.
See Comcast Corp. v. Nat'l Ass'n of Afr. Am.-Owned Media, 140 S. Ct. 1009, 1013-14
(2020) ("Few legal principles are better established than the rule requiring a plaintiff to establish
causation. In the law of torts, this usually means a plaintiff must first plead and then prove that
its injury would not have occurred 'but for' the defendant's unlawful conduct.").
82.

See generally id. at 1017-18; supra Section II.A.

83.

See infra Sections IILA, V.A.
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particular cases. As a consequence, standards of causation in disparatetreatment cases, like those in msc cases generally, have become increasingly
jumbled, illogical, and ineffective.4
III. A STRONGER FOUNDATION FOR THE CAUSAL INQUIRY

In this Part, I develop a theoretical foundation for the factorial
framework and its applicability to disparate-treatment claims. I begin by
discussing the importance of the necessity condition-the essential feature of
the but-for test and a feature that is lacking in the motivating-factor test. I then
introduce the potential-outcomes framework, a widely applicable counterfactual
model of cause and effect in the sciences. I place the but-for test within this
broader framework, and I show how the but-for test is only one measure of
cause and effect within this broader counterfactual model. I then explain why
other measures-and NESS in particular-retain the essential necessity
condition, but in a broader form that is more appropriate for disparatetreatment claims and msc situations in general.
A.

THE IMPORTANCE OF "MAKING A DIFFERENCE"

Let us begin by asking what it means for a protected characteristic, such
as race, to be a motivating factor. Consider circumstances in which a racist
employer hires a white applicant over the plaintiff, an African-American
applicant. Assume that, while the employer would favor the white applicant
based on his race, he would hire the white applicant based on his
qualifications alone, regardless of race. This is a typical mixed-motive
scenario. But what makes race a motivating factor if it made no difference in
the outcome of the employment decision?
One possibility is that the employer considered race in rendering his
employment decision.5 But precisely what does this mean? For example, is it
necessary that the employer's consideration of race be conscious? A virulent
racist who would never hire an African American over a white applicant may
have no conscious operation or accounting of race. If conscious consideration
of race is not necessary, however, is an employer's racism alone sufficient for
race to qualify as a motivating factor? For example, if an African-American
candidate applies for a position (perhaps among a dozen other applicants),
and the employer is shown to be racist through the employer's statements and
use of racial slurs two years earlier, is the employer, without more, liable for
discrimination if he does not hire the African-American applicant?
We are interested in examining the meaning of the motivating-factor test

in the absence of the necessity condition, the notion of "making a difference."
Therefore, we cannot logically ask the obvious question: did the employer's
racism make any difference in the hiring process? The motivating-factor test

84.
85.

See Counterfactual Causation, supra note 15, at 879, 884-93.
See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 239-40 (1989).
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does not depend on this. We can ask whether the employer's racism played a
role in the hiring decision; but again, what does this mean in light of the facts
above? Assume there is no evidence of any explicit or even conscious
consideration of race in the hiring process. But the employer is a known racist,
based on substantial evidence. Is the employer liable for discrimination if he
hires a white applicant who happens to be more qualified for the position?
What if, additionally, the company-say, a delivery service-is seeking to hire
a driver, and by "more qualified," we mean that a white applicant has a driver's
license whereas the African-American applicant does not. In other words, the
African-American applicant is legally unable to complete the primary function
of the position. Is the employer to be held liable for hiring a white applicant
over the African-American applicant?
Next, let us ask whether our conclusion would change if the employer
made a racial remark during the interview that made clear that he consciously
considered race in his hiring decision, but where the only African-American
candidate in the applicant pool was not licensed to drive. Even if so-if
conscious consideration is the key-then a number of other problems arise.
First, it is unclear why consciousness should be understood as the critical
element since, by this measure, a virulent racist could hire white applicants
over African-American applicants 100 out of 100 times with no liability for
discrimination if he gives no conscious consideration to the race of the
applicants. Remember, this standard does not account for "making a
difference." Perhaps the proportion of African-American hires could be used
as evidence of the employer's mental state, but it is not an aspect of the
measurement of interest. Second, and relatedly, what does conscious
consideration mean? The employer of course notices that an applicant is male
or female, or that the applicant is African American, white, or another race,
or that an applicant is wearing a yarmulke or a turban. Is this sufficient? Would
it be sufficient for liability if, during the interview of a Jewish applicant, the
employer thought of an anti-Semitic stereotype he had heard two years
earlier, but quickly pushed it out of his mind and continued the interview?
What if he thought about it for a short while before pushing it from his mind?
Or, what if he kept it in his mind throughout the hiring process and ultimately
rejected the Jewish candidate's application-but only because the applicant
was unlicensed to drive and therefore,Jewish or not, could not be hired for a
driving position.
Finally, what if a racist employer considers race in his hiring decision
but in fact hires an African-American applicant over a white applicant,
notwithstanding his race, based on the African-American applicant's
credentials? Would the African-American applicant have a cause of action
against the employer grounded in discrimination? After all, the motivatingfactor test is not outcome-based, and the employer did consider race in
deciding whether to hire the applicant. Of course, we could ask whether there
was any harm. However, the same could be asked of the applicant who was
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not licensed to drive and therefore could not have been hired whether the
employer discriminated based on race or not. Furthermore, race was a
motivating factor in the hiring decision. It ultimately did not make a
difference in the hiring decision, but it was a conscious consideration just as
it was when the unlicensed driving applicant did not get hired; and, in that
case, it did not make a difference either.
All of this is to say that the motivating-factor test is not a test of causation.
Moreover, it is vague conceptually and analytically. Even if courts could apply
it in an analytically meaningful way, it is likely to mean one thing to one jury
and a different thing to a different jury.
The motivating-factor test, therefore, essentially asks the factfinder to
decide based on policy, or the factfinder's general sense of responsibility,
whether to hold the employer liable. At the same time, however, we provide
factfinders with no direction regarding policy or criteria for responsibility. We
do not indicate, for example, whether to use a theory of deterrence or fairness
or compensation as a guide for determining whether to hold the employer
responsible. Rather, although we refer to the motivating-factor test as a
standard of causation, we simply ask the factfinder to arrive at a determination
based on its intuition.
B.

THE BUT-FOR STANDARD AS OVER-RESTRICTIVE

The discussion above highlights the inadequacy of the motivating-factor
test. Unfortunately, as indicated above, the but-for test gives rise to substantial
problems as well.86 To be sure, the but-for test is at least a straightforward and
analytical test that produces results that align with common sense in most
cases. The problem is that the but-for test denies causation in a substantial
category of discrimination claims-mixed-motive claims-in which common
sense, court decisions, and good policy dictate that causation exists.
If, as in the example above, a racist employer hired a white applicant due
to his race, but the white applicant was incidentally far better qualified than
the competing African-American applicant, using the but-for standard, the
plaintiff would be unable to establish a discrimination claim because he would
be unable to show that he would have been hired absent the discrimination.
To the contrary, because he was far less qualified than the white applicant, it
is unlikely that the plaintiff would have been hired even in the absence of any
discrimination.
Although, in this scenario, race is not a but-for cause of the adverse
employment action, it is arguably a cause in the ordinary, or common, sense
of the term, just as each fire in the concurrent two-fire problem is a cause of
the lodge's destruction notwithstanding a second sufficient fire. Moreover,
capturing the employer's discriminatory treatment as a cause in this scenario

86.

See supra Section ILB.
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likely fulfills fairness and deterrence objectives of antidiscrimination law. This
is well-supported by case law and scholarship regarding mixed-motive cases
and msc situations generally. 8 7
Thus, as a normative matter and not only as a descriptive matter, neither
the motivating-factor test nor the traditional but-for test is adequate as a
standard of causation. The motivating-factor test is not a coherent test of
causation. Arguably, it provides little more guidance than instructing the jury,
"do what you think." At the same time, the but-for test is overrestrictive and
leads to the inappropriate exclusion of certain factors that common sense,
court decisions, and good policy tell us are causes.
C.

POTENTIAL OUTCOMES: A ROBUST CAUSAL FRAMEWORK

The law need not choose between the motivating-factor test and the butfor test. Other good options are available. It is possible to apply a standard of
causation that requires an employer's discriminatory conduct to have "made
a difference" in the outcome of an employment decision without requiring a
but-for difference. In particular, it is possible to employ a broader, more
moderate form of "difference"-a less stringent version of the necessity
condition. Applying this broader form of "difference" is not a compromise
approach that manipulates the meaning of a "difference" and fabricates a new
notion of cause and effect for purposes of achieving a sought-after outcome
in mixed-motive cases and other msc situations. Instead, it reflects a wellaccepted scientific model of cause and effect and should be understood as a
refinement of both the motivating-factor test and the but-for test.
The factorial framework is based on the counterfactual model of cause
and effect known as the potential-outcomes model. Understanding this
broader scientific model is crucial for understanding the role of the but-for
estimand and the appropriateness of a broader estimand in msc situations, as
well as for attaining a refined theory and method of causation in disparatetreatment cases.

In law, the counterfactual model of causation, or "counterfactual
causation,"88 is frequently synonymized with but-for causation. But it is actually
a broader concept. In the sciences, the potential-outcomes framework
represents this broader counterfactual concept. 89 Its significance in law, more
than a mere analogy, derives from the fact that factual causation is intended
to reflect the actual, scientific, and common notion of cause and effect.90 This

87.

See infra Part V.

88.
See generally CounterfactualCausation, supranote 15 (examining the counterfactual model
of cause and effect in law and in the sciences).
89.

Id.

90.

See Richard W. Wright, The NESS Account of Natural Causation:A Response to Criticisms, in

PERSPECTIVES ON CAUSATION 285, 285

'actual', 'factual') causation").

(Richard Goldberg ed., 2011)

("natural (scientific,
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is clear from case law and scholarship, as well as from the regular application
of statistical evidence of cause and effect as defined in the sciences as evidence
of causation.91 It is also supported by the close alignment between causal
language in ordinary or common usage and the causal concept in the
sciences.92
1.

Identifying the Building Blocks of the Causal Inquiry

Under the potential-outcomes framework, causal inference starts with
defining the building blocks of a causal effect and precisely specifying the
causal estimand to be studied. The framework involves defining interventions,
or "treatments," and conceptualizing and examining causal effects based on
comparisons between "potential outcomes"-that is, outcomes that would be
realized under different treatments.93
Consider, for example, a study aimed at determining the causal effect of
pain medication with respect to a patient's backpain.94 A researcher would
begin by defining the "primitives" of the causal inquiry.95 She would define a
"unit," a person or object at a certain point in time; a "treatment," defined as
"an action or intervention that can be initiated or withheld from that unit" at
a certain point in time; an "outcome variable," a quantity of interest that is
hypothesized to be affected by the treatment; and "potential outcomes," the
outcomes (particular values of the specified outcome variable) that would be
realized if one particular treatment or another is assigned to a particular
unit.96

For example, the researcher may define a patient as a unit; define "active"
and "control" treatments, or "treatment conditions," as the administration
and non-administration of pain medication, respectively; and define the
outcome variable as the patient's level of backpain.97 She can then define

91.
See infra Section V.B; see also CounterfactualCausation, supra note 15, at goo-o2 (noting
that courts "accept and sometimes require (or at least hold as the 'gold standard') proof of
causation through statistical evidence establishing a causal connection between a defendant's
misconduct and a plaintiffs injury," and citing cases).

92.

See infra notes 233-43 and accompanying text.

93.

See GUIDO W. IMBENS & DONALD B. RUBIN, CAUSAL INFERENCE FOR STATISTICS, SOCIAL,
(2015). Throughout this Section, and

AND BIOMEDICAL SCIENCES: AN INTRODUCTION 3-30

elsewhere in this Article, I employ causal-inference terminology and notation based on the Rubin
Causal Model. See id.
94.

See id. (considering an example involving the effect of aspirin on a headache).

95.
D. James Greiner & Donald B. Rubin, CausalEffects of PerceivedImmutable Characteristics,
93 REV. ECON. & STAT. 775, 775-78 (2011); D. James Greiner, CausalInference in Civil Rights
Litigation, 122 HARV. L. REV. 533, 576-79 (2oo8).
96.
IMBENS & RUBIN, supra note 93, at 3-7; Donald B. Rubin, For Objective CausalInference,
Design Trumps Analysis, 2 ANNALS APPLIED STAT. 8o8, 811-13 (2008); see also Counterfactual
Causation, supra note 15, at 894-95; Greiner, supra note 95, at 558-61.
97.

See CounterfactualCausation, supra note 15, at 894.
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potential outcomes Y(medication) and Y(no medication) as potential pain
outcomes that would occur if the patient receives medication and if the
patient receives no medication, respectively. A causal effect can then be
specified as a comparison between the potential outcomesY(medication) and
Y(no medication).98 For example, assuming a binary outcome variable, we
can determine a causal effect based on four possible comparisons:
(i) Y(medication) = pain vs. Y(no medication) = pain; (2) Y(medication)
= no pain vs. Y(no medication) = pain; (3) Y(medication) = pain vs. Y(no
medication) = no pain; and (4) Y(medication) = no pain vs. Y(no medication)
= no pain.99 Using these comparisons of potential outcomes, the first and
fourth comparisons indicate the absence of a causal effect while the second
and third comparisons indicate the existence of a causal effect, with the
second comparison indicating that medication reduces pain and the third
comparison indicating that medication increases pain.100
Importantly, of the four possible outcomes-Y(medication) = pain,
Y(medication) = no pain, Y(no medication) = pain, Y(no medication) = no
pain-only one can be observed: the unit will receive only one treatment
-medication or no medication-and will realize only one outcome-pain or
no pain. If the patient received medication and realized an outcome of no
pain, a researcher cannot know what the outcome would have been had the
patient received no medication. For this reason, under the Rubin Causal
Model, causal inference is described as a "missing data problem": "given any
treatment assigned to an individual unit, the potential outcome associated
with any alternate treatment is missing.",1

Therefore, determining a causal effect requires inference. In particular, it
requires inferring a missing potential outcome-the potential outcome
associated with the counterfactual that did not occur (e.g., the treatment "no
medication")-and comparing the inferred potential outcome to the observed
potential outcome, the potential outcome associated with the treatment that
occurred (e.g., "medication").Sometimes, a researcher may be interested in learning about the effects
of multiple treatments, or "factors," as well as the interactions among them. A

98.
IMBENS & RUBIN, supranote 93, at 3-7; see also CounterfactualCausation, supranote
894-9599.
See IMBENS
15, at 894-95. We
outcomes, in terms
potential outcomes.

at

& RUBIN, supra note 93, at 3-7; see also CounterfactualCausation, supra note

can similarly define the outcome variable, and therefore the potential
of a pain rating from one to ten, and a causal estimand based on these

See id. at 895-97.
See IMBENS & RUBIN, supranote 93, at
at 894-95oo.

15,

5-7; see also CounterfactualCausation,supranote

15,

101.
IMBENS & RUBIN, supra note 93, at 14. See generally Donald B. Rubin, Estimating Causal
Effects of Treatments in Randomized and Nonrandomized Studies, 66J. EDUC. PSYCH. 688 (1974).
102.
See IMBENS & RUBIN, supra note 93, at 3-30. For a more extended discussion of
estimating causal effects, see CounterfactualCausation, supranote 15, at 896-97.
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study with a "factorial" design is one in which each unit is exposed to a
"treatment combination" (or "treatment condition") that is composed of a set
of factors, where each factor can be set to a certain value, or "level."1o3 For
example, if the researcher above wanted to test the effect of the pain
medication and physical therapy on the patient's backpain, she would define
the pain medication and physical therapy as factors, each of which may take
values "on" and "off." She could then define causal effects based on comparisons
between various treatment conditions involving different combinations of
these factors. She may, for example, be interested in studying the effect of
medicine and therapy together as compared to neither medicine nor therapy,
or as compared to only medicine or only therapy.104
2.

Replication, Experimentation, and Covariate Balance

In statistics and the sciences, causal inference is facilitated by replication,
and, in particular, by exposing multiple units to different treatments in an
"experiment."105 In an experiment, each unit is exposed to one treatment
condition, and while we can observe the potential outcome associated with
that treatment condition, we cannot observe the potential outcomes
associated with treatment conditions not assigned to that unit. Replication,
however, allows the researcher to impute missing potential outcomes and
6
estimate causal effects.10
Frequently,
experimentation-and
particularly,
controlling
the
assignment of treatments to units-is not possible. In such circumstances,
scientists employ "observational studies," or studies in which the researcher
does not control the assignment of treatments to units, but uses statistical
methods to make causal inferences.107 The Rubin Causal Model takes a
prospective approach to observational studies: it generally seeks to
"approximate, or attempt to replicate, a randomized experiment" by carefully
(and objectively) defining causal estimands and by seeking to recreate
comparisons that may result from a randomized experiment.os A causal
inquiry in a legal case can be understood as a type of observational study

103.
Hillel J. Bavli & Reagan Mozer, The Effects of Comparable-CaseGuidance on Awards for Pain
and Suffering and Punitive Damages:Evidence from a Randomized Controlled Trial, 37 YALE L. & POL'Y
REV. 405, 420 (2o19); Tirthankar Dasgupta, Natesh S. Pillai & Donald B. Rubin, CausalInference
from 2K FactorialDesigns by Using Potential Outcomes, 77 J. ROYAL STAT. SOC'Y. SERIES B (STAT.
METHODOLOGY) 727, 727 (2015) (proposing "[a] framework for causal inference from two-level
factorial designs ... which uses potential outcomes to define causal effects").
104.

See generally Dasgupta et al., supra note 103.

105.

IMBENS & RUBIN, supra note 93, at 3-30.

1o6.

See CounterfactualCausation, supra note 15, at 896.

107.

See IMBENS & RUBIN, supra note 93, at 41-42. See generally PAUL R. ROSENBAUM,
OBSERVATION AND EXPERIMENT: AN INTRODUCTION TO CAUSAL INFERENCE (2017).

1o8.
Donald B. Rubin, The Design Versus the Analysis of ObservationalStudies for CausalEffects:
Parallels with the Design of Randomized Trials, 26 STAT. MED. 20, 25 (2007).
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that involves inferring causal effects from evidence (statistical or

other).

Central to causal inference is the problem that replication will always be
imperfect since each unit exists only at a certain point in time. Assigning a
patient medication today and no medication tomorrow to test the difference
between backpain with medication and without medication involves
imperfect replication. This experiment involves two units: the patient today
and the patient tomorrow. There may be important differences between the
patient today and tomorrow-differences other than whether he receives
medication-and these differences, and not the treatment, could account for
differences in his backpain.109 Even assigning medication and no medication
to identical twins at the same point in time would involve imperfect
replication, since even identical twins have differences."o

Imperfect replication can cause poor imputation of missing potential
outcomes and therefore poor inference regarding causal effects. The
problem boils down to different units having different "covariates"-that is, a
unit's background characteristics that are not affected by assignment to one
treatment or another.- These can include age, race, sex, blood type, height,
pretreatment measures (such as pretreatment income or a pretreatment level
of backpain), and other characteristics. When units have different covariates,
replication becomes less useful because a researcher will have more difficulty
knowing whether observed differences between potential outcomes are
attributable to differences in treatment (e.g., medication or no medication)
or to differences in covariates (e.g., differences in pretreatment backpain of
one unit versus another, or differences in pretreatment weight, which may
impact the effectiveness of a medication).1
The primary advantage of an experimental study is that the researcher
has control over the assignment of treatment conditions to units. Therefore,
the

researcher

can, for example,

assign

treatment conditions

to units

randomly. "Randomized experiments" facilitate "balancing" covariates across
treatment groups, so that a researcher can be more confident in her
estimation of causal effects.113 For example, if a researcher has a large sample
of patients, and she randomly assigns the treatment conditions "medication"
and "no medication" to them, it is likely that the pretreatment level of

backpain (and other covariates) in the "medication" group and the "no
medication" group will be approximately the same. Therefore, a difference in
the observed outcomes of both groups with respect to backpain is more likely

i og.

CounterfactualCausation, supra note 15, at 897-900.

110.
1Il.
112.

Id.

113.

See Rubin, supranote 96, at 8og-io.

See IMBENS & RUBIN, supra note 93, at 15-16.
CounterfactualCausation, supra note 15, at 897-900.
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to be attributable to the treatment rather than a difference in pretreatment

backpain (or other covariates).
On the other hand, if a researcher is unable to control the assignment of
treatments, she must be especially conscious of covariate balance among
treatment groups.,'4 For example, if she performs an observational study by
comparing backpain outcomes in individuals who took backpain medication
to backpain outcomes in individuals who did not take backpain medication
without ensuring covariate balance, she is likely to obtain a misleading result.
After all, individuals who take backpain medication generally have far worse
backpain than those who do not take backpain medication. Even after taking
medication, they are likely still to have worse backpain than, for example, the
general public. If the researcher is not concerned with covariate balance, she
may conclude that the backpain medication causes more backpain, whereas, in
truth, the difference is likely attributable simply to the difference in
pretreatment backpain. In other words, the researcher failed to compare
apples to apples and therefore obtained a misleading result.
This type of error can sometimes be avoided with careful attention to
account for relevant covariates. When this is not possible, good inference
from this kind of data may not be possible: the data may be unreliable for
drawing causal conclusions.
When a researcher is attentive to ensuring covariate balance, she must
distinguish between covariates and another type of variable known as an
"intermediate variable." Unlike a covariate, an intermediate variable can be
affected by the treatment that a unit receives.115 For example, if the side effect

of a medicine is thirstiness, it would be a mistake to define thirstiness as a
covariate and to balance thirstiness between the "medication" and "no
medication" groups. Doing so may cause a misleading result of "no effect," for
example, if the medicine's effectiveness is highly associated with thirstiness.
In this case, ensuring that treatment groups had equal levels of thirstiness
would obscure the effect of the medication.
An important consideration in determining whether a variable is a
6
covariate or an intermediate variable is the timing of the treatment."

Remember that our definition of a treatment includes a time component, as

does our definition of a unit."7 In some studies, identifying the timing of
treatment is simple. For example, in a laboratory experiment in which a
researcher applies one medication or another to a patient, the operative time

Note that a researcher must be vigilant with respect to covariate balance even if she is
114.
able to randomize treatment assignments. For example, a researcher should check covariate
balance among treatment groups to confirm that the randomization was successful in achieving
balance. See, e.g., Bavli & Mozer, supra note 103, at 426-28.

1 16.

See Greiner, supra note 95, at 565-66.
See id.

117.

See supranotes 94-96 and accompanying text.

115.
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for precisely defining the treatment and unit is the time of that application.
As we will see below in the disparate-treatment context, however, determining
the timing of a treatment can be more complex.1'

3.

Defining a Causal Effect

The potential-outcomes notion of cause and effect forms the basis
(implicitly or explicitly) for the but-for concept in law and in common usage.
However, the but-for standard is only a particular measure of cause and effect
under the potential-outcomes framework. To describe a broader set of effects,
let us consider the simple example of the two-fire problem, and, in particular,
the causal effect of Fire A, within the context of a factorial design in the
potential-outcomes framework.9 We define two factors-Fire A and Fire B
an outcome variable of interest-a binary variable representing
-and
whether the lodge in the two-fire problem is destroyed or not destroyed. We
can then consider potential outcomes associated with each combination of
levels-"off' and "on"-linked to each factor. Figure 1 illustrates the potential
outcomes that describe a concurrent msc situation involving Fire A and Fire B.
Figure 1. 2x2 matrix illustrating potential outcomes associated with
combinations of two factors, Fire A and Fire B, each with two levels,
off and on
Fire A =off

Fire A =on

Fire B = off

Not Destroyed

Destroyed

Fire B = on

Destroyed

Destroyed

As assumed in the two-fire concurrent msc problem, the lodge is
destroyed when either Fire A or Fire B is on (upper right and lower left
quadrants) and when both Fire A and Fire B are on (lower right quadrant),
but not when neither Fire A nor Fire B is on (upper left quadrant).120
Defining a causal effect involves specifying a comparison between
potential outcomes associated with different levels of a factor. For example,
defining a causal effect of Fire A on the lodge's destruction involves a
comparison between potential outcomes associated with the two levels ("off'
and "on") of Fire A. Let us distinguish, however, between two categories of

1 18.

See infra Part IV; Greiner & Rubin, supranote 95, at 775-78; Greiner, supranote 95, at

576-79.

1 i g.
120.

See generally Dasgupta et al., supranote 103.
See CounterfactualCausation, supra note 15, at go7-o8.
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causal effects in this scenario-"unconditional" effects and "conditional"
effects-based on whether the comparison of interest is unconditional or
conditional on the level of another factor. We can refer to these effects
collectively as "main effects."121

Let me pause here to make two important notes regarding terminology.
First, in this Section's discussion, I simplify matters by using a scenario (the
two-fire scenario) that involves two factors, each having two levels, and by
classifying effects as either "unconditional" or "conditional." Indeed, this
simple model is applicable to many real-world scenarios. However, in more
complex scenarios involving additional factors, the unconditional/conditional
classification can easily be extended to describe various levels of conditioning.
Additionally, I use the term "unconditional" here to refer in particular to the
absence of any conditioning on the level of the second factor (e.g.,
conditioning on Fire B being "on"). Second, I use the term "main effects" (or
a "main-effects analysis") to capture both unconditional and conditional
effects, but with special emphasis on unconditionaleffects. I contrast it with the butfor test, emphasizing the breadth of a main-effects analysis and its ability to
capture effects that the but-for test excludes. I sometimes use the term

"unconditional effects" or "unconditional main effects" to emphasize that the
effect to which I am referring does not involve conditioning on a particular
level of a second factor. However, consistent with scientific literature, I often
use the term "main effects" (or a "main-effects analysis") to refer to
unconditional effects in particular. On the other hand, when referring in
particular to effects involving conditioning on the level of a second factor, I
always use the term "conditional effects" or "conditional main effects."
Now, in a single-factor scenario, the but-for standard reflects both types
of effects. But this is not necessarily so in multifactor situations. In the two-fire
problem illustrated in Figure 1, when considering the causal effect of Fire A,
the but-for test takes Fire B = on as given and ignores the potential outcomes
associated with Fire B = off. It therefore compares the potential outcomes
associated with the combinations (Fire A = on, Fire B = on) and (Fire A = off,

Fire B = on). That is, it compares the potential outcome in the lower right
quadrant with the potential outcome in the lower left quadrant. Because the
lodge is destroyed for each of these combinations, the but-for test leads to the
conclusion that there is no causal effect.
This causal question involves a conditional effect: it is based on a
comparison between potential outcomes associated with two levels of a factor
(Fire A = on versus Fire A = off) while holding the level of another factor (Fire
B = on) constant.

121. Seegenerally Dasgupta et al., suprarnote 103. In this Article, I reserve the term "interaction
effects," see Counterfactual Causation, supra note 15, at go6-08, to refer to contrasts between
conditional main effects. See Dasgupta et al., supranote 103, at 730.
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Using the numerical values 1 and o to represent "destroyed" and "not
destroyed," the conditional effect of Fire A on the destruction of the lodge
when Fire B = on is 1 - 1 = o. That is, the but-for effect of Fire A is zero, or
nothing, since, in the absence of Fire A-given the existence of Fire B-the
lodge would have been destroyed anyway.
Similarly, the conditional effect
of Fire B when Fire A = on is zero. There is no effect.
Unconditional main effects are different than conditional main effects.
The former effect is based on a comparison between potential outcomes
associated with two levels of a factor without holding the level of another factor
constant. Therefore, the unconditional main effect of Fire A on the state of
the lodge compares both potential outcomes associated with Fire A = on to
both potential outcomes associated with Fire A = off. There are various ways
to conduct such a comparison. For example, the effect could be defined as
the difference between the average of the two potential outcomes associated
with Fire A = on and the average of the two potential outcomes associated with
Fire A = off, where each average combines (e.g., using the mean) the two
potential outcomes associated with each level of Fire A across each level of
Fire B. Using this definition (for illustrative purposes only), the effect of Fire
A, using the notation above, would be (i + 1) /2 - (o + 1)/2 = 0.5. Therefore,
unlike our determination using the but-for standard, our unconditional maineffects analysis results in a positive effect, and findings of causation for both
Fire A and Fire B.123

The hallmark feature of an unconditional main-effects analysis is that it
defines a causal effect based on the potential outcomes associated with the
full range of treatment levels. In our example, it considers not only
counterfactuals associated with Fire A given the existence of Fire B but also
counterfactuals associated with Fire B. In other words, it asks not only what
would have happened had Fire A not occurred, given that Fire B occurred,
but also what would have happened had Fire A occurred versus not occurred
if Fire B had not occurred. In the following Section, I explain why this broader
main-effects estimand is appropriate for msc situations.
D.

THE LOGIC OFA MAIN-EFFECTS ANALYSIS-A BROADER FORM OF "DIFFERENCE"

It would not be logical to rule out an unconditional main-effects analysis
on grounds that it involves consideration of counterfactuals associated with
the non-occurrence of Fire B when we know for certain (by definition of the
two-fire msc problem) that Fire B in fact occurred. This is because the very
essence of the counterfactual model, and the but-for test in particular, is the
comparison of counterfactuals-the inference of cause and effect based not
only on what actually occurred but also what would have occurred, but did
not, under counterfactual circumstances. An unconditional main-effects

122.

See CounterfactualCausation, supra note 15, at go7-o8.

123.

See id.
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analysis in the two-fire problem simply considers counterfactuals associated
with both Fire A and Fire B.
Nevertheless, a valid question remains: even if it is logical not to rule out
an unconditional main-effects analysis, why does it make sense to employ this
analysis rather than a conditionalmain-effects analysis, and the but-for test in
particular, if we indeed know that Fire B occurred? The answer is tied directly
to the near-universal consensus that the but-for test fails in msc situations.124
The but-for test is said to fail in msc situations because its outcome in
these situations is contrary to common sense and ordinary usage and thinking
regarding the notion of cause and effect.125 However, the counterintuitive
result arises from the law's misapplication of the counterfactual model rather
than the failure of the model.2 6 In particular, the confusion arises from the
failure to adjust the traditional but-for standard of causation to account for a
multifactor setting.
The reason it is deemed incorrect to conclude that Fire A in the two-fire
problem is not a cause of the lodge's destruction is this: HadFireB not occurred,
Fire A would have destroyed the lodge; therefore, it is illogical to conclude that, simply
because Fire B also occurred, Fire A is not a cause.12 7 This reasoning, however,
follows an unconditional main-effect analysis, which defines the causal effect
of Fire A on the state of the lodge based not only on what would have
happened had Fire A not occurred (i.e., the potential outcomes associated
with Fire A = on versus Fire A = off, given the occurrence of Fire B) but also
what would have happened had Fire B not occurred (i.e., the potential
outcomes associated with Fire A = on versus Fire A = off, given the nonoccurrence of Fire B). In other words, the unconditional main-effects analysis
asks exactly what is stated in the italicized reasoning above: The conclusion
that Fire A is not a cause is illogical because had Fire B not occurred, Fire A
would have destroyed the lodge-referring explicitly to the potential
outcomes associated with the non-occurrence of Fire B, as well as those
associated with the occurrence of Fire B.12 8
Thus, the law's application of a conditional main-effects analysis rather
than an unconditional main-effects analysis can, and often does, lead to a
counterintuitive result in msc situations. Our intuition regarding cause and
effect often employs an unconditional main-effects analysis. There is no
reason that the law's standard of factual causation-intended to capture the

125.

See supranotes 6o-66 and accompanying text.
See supranotes 6o-66 and accompanying text.

126.
127.

Id. at gi 1-12.

128.

Id.

1 24.

CounterfactualCausation, supra note 15, at 907-08.
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common and scientific meaning of cause and effect-should not reflect
this.29

E.

NESS: A (LIBERAL) MAIN-EFFECTS MEASURE

The NESS test can be used to define a causal effect in an unconditional
main-effects analysis. As explained in Counterfactual Causation, an
unconditional main-effects analysis "can be simplified and applied in practice
by using the causal-set approach of the NESS test and the Restatement Third
[of Torts]."13°
The NESS test is based on the concept of a causal set-a set of factors
that together lead to the occurrence of an outcome. 131 It asks whether a factor
was a necessary element of a sufficient set.1 32 According to this test, "a
condition contributed to some consequence if and only if it was necessary for
the sufficiency of a set of existing antecedent conditions that was sufficient for
the occurrence of the consequence."133 For example, the fires in the two-fire
problem are NESS causes because each fire (individually) forms a set (of
antecedent conditions) that was sufficient for the destruction of the lodge,
where each was necessary for the sufficiency of the set. In a more complex
example involving three fires, where any two of the fires would have been
sufficient to destroy the lodge, each fire is a cause under the NESS test because
each fire is part of a set of two fires that were sufficient to bring about the
destruction of the lodge, where each fire was necessary for the sufficiency of
the set in producing the lodge's destruction.134
A simple version of this approach has been adopted by the Restatement
(Third) of Torts as the standard of causation in msc situations. In contrast
with the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which uses the substantial-factor test
as its primary definition of causation,135 section 26 of the Restatement (Third)
defines "factual causation" as a cause if it satisfies the but-for test: "Tortious
conduct must be a factual cause of harm for liability to be imposed. Conduct
is a factual cause of harm when the harm would not have occurred absent the
conduct. Tortious conduct may also be a factual cause of harm under § 27."136
Section 27 of the Restatement (Third) provides for msc situations: "If multiple

Id.

130.
131.

Id. at 9 1 7
See supranote 16 and accompanying text.

132.

See Wright, supra note 55, at 1740.

.

129.

Wright, Grounds and Extent, supra note 17, at 1441; Wright, Once More into the Bramble
Bush, supranote 17, at i102-03.
133.

134.

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 27 cmt. f

illus. 3 (AM. L. INST. 2010).
135.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 431 (AM. L. INST. 1965).

136.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 26 (AM. L.

INST. 2010).

CAUSE AND EFFECTIN ANTIDISCRIMINATIONLAW

2021 ]

5 15

acts occur, each of which under § 26 alone would have been a factual cause
of the physical harm at the same time in the absence of the other act(s), each
act is regarded as a factual cause of the harm."137
Applying the Restatement (Third) version of the test to the two-fire
problem, had each fire occurred alone (i.e., in the absence of the other fire),
each individually would have constituted a but-for cause of the lodge's
destruction; therefore, each fire is a cause under section 27. The Restatement
(Third) approach is intended to apply similarly to the three-fire problem
described above, with all three fires constituting causes under this
approach.13
As discussed above, the factorial framework allows for various measures,
or "estimands," that a court could employ as a standard of causation. The
traditional but-for test is a particular conditional effect. However, as discussed,
it may be more appropriate to employ a broader main-effects analysis in msc
situations.
The NESS test and the derivative test employed by the Restatement
(Third) can be understood as a particular unconditional main-effects
estimand.139 Let us consider the two-fire problem to understand why this is.
An unconditional main-effects analysis compares the potential outcomes
associated with Fire A = on to the potential outcomes associated with Fire A
= off without limiting the comparison to a particular level of Fire B. It
aggregates the potential outcomes in the third column of Figure 2 (the
potential outcomes associated with Fire A = on) and separately aggregates the
potential outcomes in the second column (the potential outcomes associated
with Fire A = off) and then compares the two aggregations (e.g., using
subtraction or division).
Figure 2. 2x2 matrix illustrating potential outcomes for combinations
of two factors, Fire A and Fire B, each with two levels, on and offP4

Fire A =off

Fire A =on

Fire B = off

Not Destroyed

Destroyed

Fire B= on

Destroyed

Destroyed

§ 27.

137.

Id.

138.
139.

See id. § 27 cmt. f illus. 3.
CounterfactualCausation, supra note 15, at 920.

140.

Id. at 9 o 7 -o8.
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There are numerous ways in which the sets of potential outcomes could
be aggregated and then compared. One example, discussed briefly above,
would be to average the potential outcomes associated with Fire A = on,
average the potential outcomes associated with Fire A = off, and then subtract
the latter from the former to determine the effect.141 To find an effect, a maineffects analysis looks for differences between the two sets of potential
outcomes. The particular main-effects estimand determines how such
differences translate into the "causal effect."
Using the averaging method above, if it is assumed that a studied factor
only affects the outcome in one direction-for example, that pain medication
in a particular scenario can make pain better but not worse, that pollutants in
a particular scenario can make the air more polluted but not less polluted, or
that discrimination against African Americans in a particular scenario can
make it more difficult for an African American to be hired but not less
difficult-then this method is essentially equivalent to the approach of the
NESS test and the Restatement (Third) .142
More broadly, the approach of the NESS test and the Restatement
(Third) can be understood as involving a broad unconditional main-effects
estimand that looks for the minimum difference between sets of potential
outcomes associated with different levels of a factor, such as the occurrence
and non-occurrence of a fire. It results in a determination of "causation" if
there is, for example, any difference between matrix columns reflecting the

occurrence and non-occurrence of a factor.143 Fire A is therefore a cause of
the lodge's destruction because, either when Fire B = off or when Fire B = on,
Fire A being on versus off makes a difference. In particular, in the 2x2 matrix
in Figure 2, when Fire B = off, the lodge is destroyed when Fire A = on, but
not when Fire A = off. This explanation applies similarly to more complex msc
situations.144
IW. A FACTORIAL FRAMEWORK FOR DISPARATE-TREATMENT CASES

The factorial framework should be understood as both a general theory
of causation for disparate-treatment cases and a concrete method for
resolving causal inquiries in these cases. It is grounded in the potentialoutcomes framework and the logic of main-effects estimands in msc
situations. An important component of this approach is carefully defining the
primitives of the causal inquiry, including units, treatments, and outcome
variables, as well as the causal estimand-the measure of causation in terms

See supra Section III.C. 3

See CounterfactualCausation, supra note 15, at 92o.

143.

See id. at 922 n.119 and accompanying text.

144.

See id. at g2o-23.

.

141.
142.

2021 ]

CAUSE AND EFFECTIN ANTIDISCRIMINATIONLAW

5 17

of potential outcomes.45 Understanding these concepts within a case enables
a proper conceptualization of the causal inquiry and the evidentiary
inferences required to make causal conclusions.
In this Part, I outline the proposed method for addressing causal
questions in disparate-treatment claims. I also discuss the central role of the
potential-outcomes framework, and the importance of "preemption"and the
damages phase for preventing false findings of causation and windfall
recoveries.
A.

PROVING CAUSATION

The factorial approach adopts the NESS test as the appropriate causal
estimand in disparate-treatment claims-the standard of causation that must
be satisfied to prove a claim. Applying the potential-outcomes model and the
NESS test as its causal estimand allows for a simpler, more coherent, and more
effective proof scheme.
A summary of this approach is as follows:
1. To establish a prima facie disparate-treatment claim, a plaintiff
must satisfy a form of the McDonnellDouglas criteria: (a) membership
in a protected class; (b) an open employment opportunity controlled
by the defendant; (c) minimal qualification for the employment
opportunity; (d) an adverse employment action; and (e) a causal
link-using NESS causation and the potential-outcomes model
-between
the employer's discriminatory conduct and its adverse
employment action.14 6
2. Although the plaintiff retains the burden of production and
persuasion, the defendant may respond to the plaintiffs allegations
by (a) rebutting the plaintiffs allegations, or (b) establishing a
sufficient legitimate purpose.

3. If the defendant establishes a sufficient legitimate purpose, the
plaintiff must satisfy her burdens of production and persuasion by
establishing (a) that the protected feature is a NESS cause (even if
not a but-for cause) of the adverse employment action, or (b) that
the defendant's alleged legitimate purpose cannot explain the
adverse employment action-either because the purpose is not
applicable to the plaintiff or because the purpose was not in fact
sufficient.
Let us consider this framework in greater detail. Consider a sexdiscrimination claim filed by Monica, a female employee of a large technology

Greiner & Rubin, supra note 95, at 775-78; Greiner, supra note 95, at 576-79; see supra
145.
Section III.C.
146.

See generally supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text.
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corporation, alleging that her employer deprived her of a promotion due to
her sex. 147 The employer acknowledged promoting Jerry, a male employee,
over Monica, but argued that Jerry received the promotion because he was
more qualified for the position.
Monica must begin by alleging facts sufficient to establish: (a) membership
in a protected class; (b) an open employment opportunity controlled by the
defendant; (c) minimal qualification for the employment opportunity; (d) an
adverse employment action; and (e) a causal link between the employer's
discriminatory conduct and its adverse employment action.148 These elements

147.

I use the tern "sex," as distinct from "gender," for consistency with the language of Title VII.

148.
Professor Brian Clarke has proposed a "revised McDonnell Douglas proof scheme" in
which a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case by proving that "(1) the plaintiff has a protected
trait; (2) the plaintiff was performing her job at a level that met the employer's reasonable
expectations; (3) the plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) the adverse action
occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination." Brian S. Clarke, A
Better Route Through the Swamp: CausalCoherence in DisparateTreatment Doctrine, 65 RUTGERS L. REV.
723, 78o-81 (2013). Clarke's proposal involves a burden-shifting scheme in which a plaintiff's
proof of her prima facie case would shift the burden to the defendant to "articulate all of the
legitimate non-discriminatory reasons ... for its decision." Id. "If the defendant satisfies this
burden of production, the presumption of discrimination is rebutted" and "the plaintiff must
then prove that the employer's consideration of her protected trait was a necessary element of
the set of facts and circumstances that led to the defendant's decision." Id. at 781. The plaintiff,
under Clarke's method, can do this by "either (1) showing that at least one of the defendant's
stated [legitimate purposes] is unworthy of credence"-in which case it should, per Clarke's
approach, be inferred that the employer "lied ... to cover up its consideration of the employee's
protected trait"-"or (2) presenting other evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude
that the employer's consideration of her protected trait was a necessary element of the set of facts
and circumstances that led to the defendant's decision." Id. at 781-82.
The factorial framework differs from Clarke's proposal in various critical respects. First,
it is premised on a theory of cause and effect grounded in the potential-outcomes model. This
conceptual model is fundamental to both the theoretical foundation and the practical method
proposed in this Article. Second, although both the factorial framework and Clarke's proposal
seem to outwardly employ the NESS test, the causal standard in Clarke's proposal seems
substantially narrower-as permitting a finding of causation when a "protected trait was a
necessary element of the set of facts and circumstances that led to the defendant's decision." Id.
at 781. But, because this test seems to capture only necessary elements of the set of elements that
(in fact) "led to the defendant's decision," it is a version of the traditional but-for test. Compare
this to the framework proposed herein, which requires only that the discriminatory force be a
necessary element of a set of elements sufficient for the occurrence of the adverse decision. This
estimand deviates substantially from the but-for test and constitutes a main-effects analysis in the
potential-outcomes framework. In other words, a key feature of the NESS test, as employed in the
factorial framework, is its ability to capture as causes forces that were not in fact necessary for the
occurrence of the adverse outcome. Instead, it only requires fulfillment of the necessity condition
in a broader sense-for example, that even absent certain other forces, a protected feature would
have made a difference. Third, the factorial framework, in contrast with Clarke's proposal,
incorporates the concepts of treatment timing, covariates, and "preemption," all crucial to its
application of NESS, and to preventing unjustified findings of liability and windfall recoveries.
Clarke's application of "unclean hands as an equitable affirmative defense to [certain] remedies"
to prevent windfall recoveries is arguably insufficient in various respects-for example, as
addressing only a certain type of windfall recovery and as allowing unjustified findings of liability.
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are a form of those articulated in McDonnell Douglas to establish a prima facie
discrimination claim.149 In establishing these elements, a plaintiff must
-implicitly or explicitly-identify the primitives of the causal inquiry. In this
case, the primitives can be derived straightforwardly from Monica's claim:
Monica is the sole unit; sex is the protected feature; the employer's perception
of Monica's sex is the treatment variable; and Monica's promotion status is
the outcome variable of interest.1so The timing of the treatment can be

defined as beginning the moment that the employer first perceived Monica's
sex.151

Note that there are various reasons for basing a treatment variable, both
in terms of timing and substance, on the perceptionof a plaintiff's sex, race, or
other protected characteristic.152 Some of these reasons are technical-for
example, grounded in the meaning of a treatment and other causal concepts
in the potential-outcomes framework-and others are substantive.153 For our
purposes, using perception as a basis for the timing of a treatment generally
makes most sense with respect to the law's conception of discrimination and
for understanding important concepts in the causal framework, such as
preemption, covariate values, and intermediate variables.154 Relatedly,
Id. at 785. Fourth, the factorial framework's foundation for reshaping the causal standard in
disparate-treatment claims, in contrast with Clarke's proposal, is grounded in the common and
scientific notions of cause and effect, the relationship between but-for causation and the broader
counterfactual model, and a range of policy objectives, including deterrence, fairness, and
efficiency. Fifth, the factorial framework seeks to pivot the proposed causal standard to move
disparate-treatment proof schemes in the direction of the more basic structure applied in torts
cases generally.
Clarke's proposal to employ NESS and a modified McDonnellDouglas test is innovative
and sound. Indeed, these components are central features of the factorial framework. Clarke's
proposal is a move in the right direction; however, for the foregoing reasons and various others,
it seems to fall short of a solution to the current problems surrounding standards of causation in
disparate-treatment cases.
149.
See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973); see also supra notes
26-35 and accompanying text.
150.
See supranotes 94-100.
151.

See infra Section IV.B; Greiner & Rubin, supra note 95, at 775-78; Greiner, supra note

95, at 576-79.
152.

153.
154.

Greiner, supranote 95, at 576-77.
Id.; Greiner & Rubin, supranote 95, at 775.
Greiner, supranote 95, at 576-77. As Professor Greiner has explained,
The law's focus on the specific actor's decisionmaking requires, indeed compels, the
analyst to regard as "given" the characteristics of individuals that were in place prior
to the individuals' interaction with the actor. The only way to do that is to define the
treatment as taking place at some moment of perception by the actor of the
characteristic common to the group.

Id. Arguably, there are theoretical difficulties with defining a treatment variable in an
observational study based directly on an "immutable characteristic, such as race or sex." Greiner
& Rubin, supra note 95, at 775. This is due, in part, to "the impossibility of manipulating such
traits in a way analogous to administering a treatment in a randomized experiment and the
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throughout this Article, references to discrimination, discriminatory factors,
and protected characteristics as treatment variables should be interpreted in
terms of the employer's perception of the employee's protected characteristic.
Thus, to establish a prima facie discrimination claim, Monica must
establish causation based on the primitives of the causal inquiry and the NESS
estimand. Although the elements of the claim are similar to those in the
McDonnell Douglas test, the proposed approach requires an explicit showing
of causation (with direct or circumstantial evidence), whereas some
articulations of a prima facie discrimination claim under McDonnell Douglas
do not. 155 On the other hand, at this early stage of the litigation, requiring the
claimant to meet a standard of NESS causation should not erect a substantial
barrier to establishing a claim as compared to the motivating-factor test. A
showing of but-for causation would establish NESS causation since the former
is a particular category of the latter. However, although NESS requires that
the protected feature "made a difference," it is far less stringent than the but-

for test. In practice-certainly at this early stage-it is more similar, in terms
of proof, to the motivating-factor test. Critically, it may allow a plaintiff to
avoid summary judgment even when she is unable to establish but-for
causation. Indeed, the NESS test can be understood as a refinement of the
motivating-factor test, and other than establishing elements (b) and
(c) above, the plaintiff need not rule out alternative explanations for an
adverse employment action, since even other sufficient factors would not
preclude a finding of causation under the NESS test if, for example, in the
absence of another factor, the protected feature would have made a
difference.

Requiring a plaintiff to establish but-for causation at this point, as part of
her prima facie claim, would trivialize the claim in the sense that a plaintiff
could not be expected to foresee all possible legitimate factors that a
defendant will raise. On the other hand, requiring a plaintiff to establish
NESS causation as part of her prima facie claim does not require the plaintiff
to foresee the defendant's argument; itjust requires some evidence of a causal
link, even if that link, for example, assumes the absence of legitimate factors.
A defendant may respond to a plaintiffs allegations in two ways. First, the
defendant may dispute the plaintiffs allegations. For example, Monica's

danger of posttreatment bias stemming from the fact that almost all variables on which a
researcher would like to condition are determined after an individual's conception." Id. (citing
sources). For an extensive discussion of this issue, see id.
Note that at the pleading stage, the proposed approach requires that a discrimination
155.
plaintiff allege explicitly a causal link between the discriminatory conduct and the adverse
employment decision. A thorough examination of the pleading requirements is beyond the scope
of this Article. However, in general, to avoid dismissal, the complaint must allege facts that, if
"taken as true," "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face"-in particular, as in other torts
claims, the plaintiff must plausibly allege the elements of misconduct, causation, and harm. Bell
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556, 570 (2007).
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employer may show why Monica was ineligible for a promotion or show that
there was no promotion opportunity in the first instance. More generally, one
important way for the defendant to respond to the plaintiff's allegations is by
showing that any discrimination was (to use NESS terminology) "preempted"
by a preexisting condition that was determinative of the outcome-i.e., that
was sufficient for the occurrence of the alleged adverse employment action.15 6
As discussed in Section II.B, a preemptive-causation problem is a type of
msc situation in which one force precedes the other, such as when one fire in
the two-fire problem arrives to destroy a lodge immediately before the other
fire arrives.157 In these situations, the first force and not the second is deemed a
cause of the outcome. This is true legally, intuitively, by definition of NESS
causation, and in the potential-outcomes framework, all of which require that
a force act on the unit prior to the determination of the outcome in order for
it to qualify as a cause. In terms of the potential-outcomes framework, a
treatment must precede an outcome,15 8 and, in terms of the NESS test, a force
must be antecedent to the consequence at issue.159 In short, a showing that a set
of conditions preempted the alleged discrimination-including the absence
of an open employment opportunity or the plaintiffs failure to minimally
qualify for the opportunity-amounts to proof that discrimination cannot be
a cause of the adverse employment action. I return to this issue in Section IV.B.2.
Second, the employer may demonstrate facts establishing a sufficient
legitimate purpose (or sufficient legitimate purposes) for the adverse
employment action. By making such a showing, the employer establishes that
discrimination is not a but-for cause of the adverse decision. Importantly,
however, the legitimate purpose must itself be sufficient to bring about the
decision, and not sufficient only in combination with the discriminatory
purpose, since, otherwise, the legitimate purpose cannot rebut the plaintiffs
allegations of a causal link. 60
It is important to realize that a sufficient legitimate purpose does not
preclude NESS causation, the standard required for the plaintiff to prove her
claim. It does, however, preclude but-for causation, which, at least initially
-by
default, since the defendant has not yet introduced legitimate

156.
See supra Section II.B; Wright, supra note 55, at 1794-98 (explaining preemptive
causation).
157.

See supra Section II.B; Wright, supra note 55, at 1794-98.

158.

See Counterfactual Causation, supra note 15, at 914-15; Greiner, supra note 95, at 558-60.

159.
See Wright, supra note 55, at 1774, 1795 ("[T]he NESS test states that a particular
condition was a cause of a specific consequence if and only if it was a necessary element of a set
of antecedent actual conditions that was sufficient for the occurrence of the consequence.").
160.
If the employer simply shows that a legitimate purpose was part of the set of forces that
brought about the adverse action, this does not rule out but-for causation. For example, if an
employer fires an employee due to a combination of the employee being African American and
frequently arriving late to work, the employee's race is a but-for cause of the adverse employment
action.
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purposes-will often be the form of NESS causation that a plaintiff establishes
in order to satisfy the elements of her prima facie claim. 61 Moreover, a
showing of sufficient legitimate purposes specifies a concrete set of factors to
consider in determining whether discrimination is a NESS cause of the
adverse employment action, and the defendant's legitimate-purpose defense
can in fact rebut NESS causation evidentiarily.1 6 2
Finally, although a plaintiff may have initially alleged NESS causation in
a single-factor situation, if the defendant has established a sufficient legitimate
purpose, the plaintiff may respond to the defendant's rebuttal in two ways.
First, the plaintiff may produce evidence establishing that discrimination,
although not a but-for cause, is a NESS cause of the adverse employment
action.1 63 In many cases, this showing will take the form articulated in the
Restatement (Third) of Torts: discrimination will be deemed a cause if, in the
absence of the legitimate factor, the protected feature would have made a
difference.1 64 For example, the test would ask whether, assuming Monica were
equally qualified for the promotion, Monica's sex would mean the difference
between getting and not getting the promotion. This test effectively asks the
factfinder to compare the potential outcomes in the top row of the 2x2 matrix
in Figure 3 in addition to the potential outcomes in the bottom row. If either
of the rows entails a contrast of potential outcomes, comparing Male to
Female, then the standard for causation is satisfied.

161.
Recall that establishing a force as a but-for cause necessarily establishes that it is a NESS
cause also.
162.
Even if it is assumed that the plaintiff introduced evidence sufficient to establish a high
probability of NESS causation as part of her prima facie case and prior to the defendant
introducing a legitimate purpose, an inference of discrimination and causation may be heavily
based on the absence of an alternative explanation for the adverse employment action. If, for
example, the defendant introduces overwhelming evidence that he fired the plaintiff because she
hit a customer, the question would then become whether the employer would have fired the
plaintiff even had she not hit the customer. However, the plaintiffs earlier evidence of NESS
causation, and the inference that it permitted, may now be substantially weaker in light of the
defendant's legitimate-purpose defense. See generally Edward K. Cheng, Reconceptualizing the
Burden ofProof, 122 YALE L.J 1254 (2013).

163.

See generally supra note 162.

164.

See supranotes 136-38.
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Figure 3. 2x2 matrix depicting potential outcomes in a msc situation in
which the NESS estimand asks factfinders to compare potential outcomes
associated with sex = Male to those associated with sex = Female for both
"Strongly Qualified" and "Weakly Qualified," and to conclude that sex is a
cause if either comparison yields a difference in potential outcomes

Male

Female

Strongly Qualified

Promoted

Not Promoted

Weakly Qualified

Not Promoted

Not Promoted

This standard is far less demanding than but-for causation. For example,
Monica may well be able to provide sufficient evidence to establish NESS
causation even if the defendant provides strong evidence that Monica was less
qualified for the promotion than her male colleague and that she would not
have received the promotion regardless of whether she was female or male.
The second way in which the plaintiff may respond to the defendant's
rebuttal is by showing that the legitimate purpose alleged cannot explain the
adverse employment decision, either because the purpose is not applicable to
the plaintiff or because the purpose was not in fact sufficient. This showing
serves as indirect proof of causation because it demonstrates that the
defendant's legitimate purpose can at most be sufficient only in combination
with the discriminatory purpose and therefore cannot serve as a rebuttal to
the plaintiffs prima facie claim. 6 5 This method of responding to a
defendant's legitimate purpose is similar to showing that an alleged legitimate
purpose is pretextual under current antidiscrimination proof schemes.
However, it provides a concrete method for establishing the invalidity of a
defendant's alleged legitimate purpose. If the legitimate purpose is not
applicable or is not sufficient for the occurrence of the adverse employment
decision, then it cannot explain the decision and is therefore invalid as a
rebuttal of the plaintiffs prima facie discrimination claim-it is, in other
words, pretextual.
Thus, both of the foregoing methods can be used to invalidate the
defendant's legitimate-purpose rebuttal. A showing of insufficiency
demonstrates that the alleged reason cannot serve as an explanation for the
decision, and a showing that the discriminatory factor is a NESS cause of the
decision establishes that, regardless of whether the defendant's legitimate

Note that, in the factorial model, the issue of "pretext," in a certain sense, becomes
165.
somewhat less important, since proof of NESS causation is consistent with proof of a sufficient
legitimate factor.
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purpose is pretextual or not, it is at best one of two causes, with the other cause
being illegitimate.
Note that throughout the discrimination case, the plaintiff retains the
burdens of production and persuasion. Additionally, in contrast with Title
VII's current proof scheme-which involves both the motivating-factor test
and the but-for test-the proposed approach involves only a single causal
estimand-NESS. Moreover, the proposed approach involves no burden
shifting and no meaningful distinction between direct and indirect forms of
evidence, except as these categories of evidence are distinct in the general
torts context. 66 A plaintiff must prove NESS causation in order to prove her
claim. A defendant may, as in other torts claims, produce evidence to rebut
this element of the claim. If, in light of the defendant's evidence, no
reasonable jury could conclude that discrimination was the cause of the
adverse employment decision, then the plaintiff has not met her burden of
production, and the court may grant judgment to the defendant. However,
unlike current standards, which frequently employ the stringent but-for
estimand, the plaintiff must only produce sufficient evidence for a reasonable
jury to find that the employer's discrimination was a NESS cause of the adverse
employment action. If the plaintiff meets its burden of production, then the
claim is decided by the finder of fact-requiring that the plaintiff meet its
burden of persuasion and prove beyond a preponderance of the evidence that
the defendant's discrimination is a NESS cause of the adverse employment
decision. 6 7
Finally, in contrast with Title VII's burden-shifting scheme, a plaintiffs
inability to prove but-for causation does not preclude her ability to recover
damages. 68 Rather, proving NESS causation in the factorial framework,
unlike proving that a protected characteristic is a motivating factor in Title
VII's current burden-shifting scheme, permits the full range of damages that
would be available to a plaintiff who proved but-for causation. 69

166.
All evidence of causation under the potential-outcomes framework is circumstantial in
the sense that it requires inferences regarding potential outcomes associated with counterfactual
states of the world.

Importantly, the proposed approach is not intended to affect the ability of a court to
167.
award injunctive relief to stop ongoing discriminatory conduct-a legislative issue separate from
the current proposal. Instead, the focus of the proposed approach is on private actions for
damages.
168.

See supranotes 37-39 and accompanying text.

Seegenerally supra Section II.A. Congress and the courts have been very reluctant to apply
the motivating-factor test as a standalone, or even primary, standard of causation. Rather, in the
narrow circumstances in which courts allow a plaintiff to rely on the motivating-factor test, the
law severely limits the relief available to the plaintiff. See supra Section IIA; see also Babb v. Wilkie,
1 4 o S. Ct. i168, 1177-78 (2020) (limiting relief to "injunctive or other forward-looking relief'
for "plaintiffs who demonstrate only that they were subjected to unequal consideration").
169.
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THE CENTRALITY OF THE POTENTIAL-OUTCOMES FRAMEWORK

The potential-outcomes framework plays a central role in both the
theoretical and the practical components of the proposed approach to
causation. It refines the causation inquiry by defining precisely what is meant
by counterfactual causation, by providing a robust theoretical framework for
asking and answering causal questions, and by creating a more seamless
connection with evidence of causation.170 As explained above, this theoretical
framework also provides a strong foundation for the use of NESS as the causal
estimand and a principal feature of the factorial approach.
In addition to its centrality to the meaning of causation in the factorial
approach, the potential-outcomes framework is fundamental to the proof
scheme described in the previous Section and, in particular, to determining
whether the standard of causation has been satisfied.
1.

Thinking Precisely About Proof

Identifying the primitive elements of the causal inquiry is valuable for
thinking clearly about what a plaintiff or a defendant needs to prove. A
plaintiff must identify, implicitly or explicitly, the units (e.g., the plaintiff, or
perhaps all female employees of a company), the precise treatment variable
(e.g., sex), including its relevant values (e.g., female and male) and its timing
(e.g., the moment the defendant employer perceived the plaintiff's sex), and
the outcome variable (e.g., promotion) and its relevantvalues (e.g., promoted
or not promoted). In some cases, identifying these primitives will be relatively
straightforward and in others they will require more thought and judgment.71
Either way, these elements serve as the building blocks of the causal
inquiry. In defending against the plaintiff's discrimination claim, the
defendant may challenge the primitives identified by the plaintiff. If the
defendant alleges a legitimate purpose, it must similarly identify with
precision the primitive elements of the causal inquiry involving the legitimate
purpose.
Moreover, the potential-outcomes framework permits a precise
conceptualization of the causal inquiry for factfinding. Regardless of how
straightforward it is to identify the primitives associated with the parties'
respective causal arguments, specifying potential outcomes and defining a
causal effect with reference to them is an important component of making
good inferences with respect to the causal inquiry. This is particularly so when
the inquiry involves multiple factors. In these cases, precisely identifying
causal primitives and potential outcomes facilitates a clear understanding of
how causal factors interact and what inferences are required-in terms of well-

See generally Counterfactual Causation, supra note 15 (applying the potential-outcomes
170.
framework to improve standards of causation in law).
171.

See infra notes 179-97 and accompanying text.
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defined potential outcomes-to satisfy the causal standard. In short, it
facilitates an accurate causal determination. For example, in the illustration
above involving Monica,172 identifying primitives and potential outcomes
allows the factfinder to build, figuratively or literally, a matrix, such as that
depicted in Figure 4, that provides a breakdown of the potential outcomes
associated with each combination of factors and facilitates clear comparisons
among them.
Figure 4. The factorial framework requires that a factfinder make
inferences regarding potential outcomes, and complete, explicitly or
implicitly, a matrix similar to the 2x2 matrix depicted

Male

Female

Strongly Qualified??
Weakly Qualified?

2.

Distinguishing Covariates from Intermediate Variables

In addition to facilitating precision in proving causation, the potentialoutcomes framework is central to attaining accurate causal determinations by
allowing litigants, courts, and factfinders to distinguish covariates from
intermediate variables. As explained above, covariates are background
variables that cannot be affected by the treatment variables.73 An individual's
height and pretreatment level of education are generally good examples of
covariates. Intermediate outcome variables ("intermediate variables" or
"intermediate outcomes") are variables that may be affected by the treatment
1
but that are not the outcome variable of interest in the case. 74 Intermediate

variables are important because a treatment may have a causal effect on an
outcome variable via, or somehow associated with, its impact on an
intermediate variable. For example, if an employee alleges that her employer
intentionally discriminated against her based on her race by paying her less
than her white colleagues, and she specifies race as the treatment variable and
salary as the outcome variable, she may identify intermediate variables based
on promotion or evaluation. It may be critical to distinguish these variables
from covariates, such as a plaintiff's pretreatment level of education.175

172.
173.
174.
175.

See supra Section I.A.
See supra Section III.C.2.
See supra Section III.C.2.
See Greiner, supra note 95, at 577-78.
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Indeed, it is of central importance to distinguish covariates from
intermediate variables for two reasons: (a) making appropriate comparisons,
and (b) identifying preemptive causes.
i.

Appropriate Comparisons

When comparing one unit to other units for purposes of estimating the
impact of a protected feature on an outcome variable (such as promotion or
salary), it is appropriate to condition on relevant covariates. It is appropriate
to compare individuals with and without the protected feature, conditional
on them all having approximately the same relevant covariates. For example,
a plaintiff may wish to show that an employer discriminates by tending to
choose white candidates for hire over African-American candidates. The
plaintiff's argument will be far stronger if, for example, his evidence involves
African-American candidates having the same (or better) qualifications than
the white candidates that were hired over them, and weaker if he cannot
demonstrate that the African-American candidates had qualifications that
were at least as strong as their white counterparts.
On the other hand, when making such comparisons-whether with
statistical evidence involving a large dataset or just individual comparisons
-it is not appropriate to condition on intermediate variables. A protected
feature's effect on an outcome variable may, for example, operate via the
intermediate variable, and conditioning on the intermediate variable may
lead to a determination of no effect when one in fact exists.17 6 For example,
imagine a company that has a pay scale based on level of seniority in the
company's hierarchical structure. A female employee starts her employment
in the same position as a male employee. Five years later, the male employee
is earning substantially more than the female employee because he has been
promoted four times, whereas the female employee has only been promoted
once. Conditioning on number of promotions (or level of seniority) would be
a mistake. Promotion is an intermediate variable, and although the outcome
variable is salary, conditioning on number of promotions likely ignores
exactly the operation through which the employer discriminates against
female employees and, as a consequence, pays them less. It would be invalid
for the defendant employer to argue that the plaintiff must prove disparate
salaries only while comparing female employees to male employees of the same
level of seniority. Female employees in this scenario are paid less precisely
because the employer discriminates against them on the basis of sex by failing
to promote them at the same rate as their male counterparts.

The distinction between covariates and intermediate variables is crucial
to any form of comparison-whether through individual comparison
evidence or complex statistical analysis involving regression or other

176.

See id. at 576-80.
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inferential methods. And, as Professor Greiner has stated, "classifying
variables as covariates or intermediate outcomes . . . requires the analyst to
understand the data-generating process thoroughly."177 Indeed, it requires a
framework, such as the potential-outcomes framework, for precisely defining
the causal inquiry and its primitive elements.17 8
ii.

Preemptive Causation

The distinction between covariates and intermediate variables is also
fundamental to conceptualizing the causal problem in the first instance, and,
in particular, to determining whether a legitimate purpose is "preemptive" of
an alleged discriminatory factor.179 If a legitimate purpose is a covariate and
is sufficient for the occurrence of the adverse employment action
-presumably, it is alleged to be sufficient, since sufficiency is required to
defeat but-for causation-then it is preemptive of the discriminatory factor.
In other words, the outcome variable will have been determined prior to the
unit's exposure to the discriminatory factor, implying that the discriminatory
factor cannot be a cause of the outcome, the adverse employment action. As
indicated above, our common intuition, the potential-outcomes framework,
the NESS test, and other models of cause and effect, all tell us that a
prerequisite of a treatment causing an outcome is the condition that exposure
to the treatment must have preceded the outcome.1o
The potential-outcomes framework permits a clear distinction between
covariates and intermediate variables, and this distinction, in turn, allows an
understanding of when the outcome variable is "fixed" (i.e., determined)
prior to the unit's exposure to treatment-that is, of when the discriminatory
factor is preempted by a legitimate purpose. In particular, a legitimate
purpose is a preemptive cause of the adverse employment action when it is a
sufficient covariate, a variable that cannot be affected by treatment and that
is sufficient for the occurrence of the adverse outcome.11
This reasoning provides a good explanation for two elements of the
factorial framework's prima facie case adopted from the McDonnell Douglas
proof scheme-the requirement that a plaintiff establish the existence of an
open employment opportunity controlled by the defendant and show that she
met minimal qualifications for the opportunity.8 2 Both of these elements

177.

Id. at 58o.

178.

See generally id. at 576-80.

179.
See supra notes 156-60 and accompanying text; Wright, supra note 55, at 1794-98
(explaining preemptive causation).
18o.

See supranotes 156-60 and accompanying text.

181.
To constitute a cause, the preemptive factor would also need to satisfy a necessity
condition. For purposes of our discussion of preemption, however, what is important (regardless
of whether the legitimate purpose satisfies such a condition) is whether the factor is a covariate
and is sufficient for the adverse outcome.
182.

See supra Section I.A.
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reflect legitimate purposes that preempt the possibility of any discriminatory
effect. They entail an outcome that precedes the treatment.

This component of the factorial framework is central to its sensibility. For
example, imagine a racist gas station attendant who works as an employee, but
who would not hire an African-American applicant if he were hypothetically the
owner of the gas station. Imagine that he even admits to this openly. Applying
a NESS standard of causation without concern for preemption, the gas station
attendant may be found liable for discriminating against an African-American
plaintiff by not hiring him. After all, there is good evidence that, had there
been a job opening controlled by the defendant, the defendant would not
have hired the plaintiff on account of his race. But a finding of liability in this
scenario is illogical because there was no job opening controlled by the
defendant in the first instance. The defendant did not even own the business
or have other authority through which to offer ajob.
Similarly, imagine a case in which the plaintiff alleges discrimination on
the basis of sex, but in which the plaintiff, an applicant for a delivery-driver
position, did not even have a driver's license or know how to drive. In this
case, the legitimate purpose-not meeting minimal qualifications for the
position-preempted any possible discriminatory effect. In other words, the
outcome was entirely determined prior to the treatment. The job offer was

foreclosed prior to the employer's perception of the plaintiffs sex.
Thus, when an alleged legitimate purpose preempts the discriminatory
factor, there is no causation. Two main categories of preemptive causes are
reflected in the McDonnell Douglas factors-the absence of an open
employment opportunity and the absence of minimal qualifications. More
broadly, however, this occurs when the legitimate purpose constitutes a
sufficient covariate, in which case the outcome of the theoretical employment
decision is determined prior to treatment. In other words, the employment
opportunity is foreclosed prior to the defendant's perception of the protected
feature.

But consider again the distinction between a covariate and an
intermediate variable: a covariate is a variable that cannot be affected by
treatment, whereas an intermediate variable can be affected by treatment. It
is frequently nontrivial to determine whether a legitimate purpose is a
covariate or an intermediate variable. For example, imagine that in response
to allegations of discrimination based on sex, an employer acknowledges ajob
opening and the plaintiffs satisfaction of minimal qualifications, but asserts
that the plaintiff's qualifications were worse than those of another applicant,
who happened to be male. In effect, as is frequently the case, the employer
alleges a legitimate purpose that involves a set of values representing different
aspects of the plaintiffs qualifications (relative to those of her male
counterpart) rather than a single value.
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First, remember that a treatment is defined as an intervention at a

particular point

in

time.183

The

time

element-among

the

primitive

components of the causal inquiry (implicit in the treatment and unit
elements)-is fundamental to understanding whether a variable (in this case,
a set of values) is a covariate or intermediate variable. In this example, we
need to consider whether the treatment, the perception of the plaintiff's sex,

came before or after the determination-or instantiation184-ofthe plaintiff's
qualification values relative to those of her male counterpart. Are these
objects "random variables," having multiple potential values, or are they
rather fixed values by the time the treatment occurs?

At first glance, it may seem as though the plaintiffs qualifications are
determined prior to her job application, which would imply that the set of
values representing her qualifications would be a covariate. But this is not the
case. It is the employer's perception of the plaintiff's qualifications relative to
those of her male counterpart that is relevant to the inquiry.1 85 The alleged
legitimate purpose is based on this perception, and this perception may well
be affected by the employer's perception of the plaintiffs sex. In other words,
the defendant's assertion of a legitimate purpose based on the plaintiffs
qualifications relative to those of her male counterpart likely involves an
intermediate variable rather than a covariate.
To be sure, the question of whether a legitimate purpose constitutes a
covariate or intermediate variable is a matter of judgment.1 86 It depends on
the particulars of the legitimate purpose. Whether it is a covariate or
intermediate variable depends on whether it can be affected by the
defendant's perception of the plaintiffs protected trait. And this is a matter
ofjudgment.
As an illustration, distinguish the foregoing legitimate purpose-the
plaintiff's weak qualifications relative to another applicant's qualifications
-from a legitimate purpose reflected in the McDonnell Douglas factors, the
failure of the plaintiff to minimally qualify for the employment opportunity.
For example, let us return to the case of a delivery-driver applicant who does
not have a driver's license. Like the weak-qualifications allegation, it must be
determined whether this feature of the plaintiff, the absence of a driver's
license, is subject to the post-treatment perception of the employer.
Specifically, can the employer's perception of the plaintiffs sex affect his
perception of whether the plaintiff meets the minimal qualifications of the
open position? The answer: likely not.

183.

See supra note 96 and accompanying text.

184.
This term is borrowed from the broader causation literature. See Wright & Puppe, supra
note 78, at 466-73.
185. See supra notes 151-54 and accompanying text.

186.

Greiner, supra note 95, at 578-79; see Greiner & Rubin, supra note 95, at 775-78.
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As another illustration, consider a scenario in which an elderly man asks
a potential employer for ajob and is rejected, allegedly on the basis of age. If
it is determined that no open job existed at the time the elderly man
requested a job-in the sense that the defendant's perception of the
plaintiff's age could not have impacted whether a job opening became
available-then the condition "no open position" is a sufficient covariate and
preempts any possibility of discrimination. This may occur, for example, if, as
above, the defendant did not own a business or have any other authority
through which to offer a job. It may occur even if the defendant did own a
business but was in no position to hire a new employee. This is a matter of
judgment. On the other hand, if the defendant is an employer who has a
history of impromptu hiring, then it is possible that the employer's perception
of the plaintiffs age indeed affected his decision whether to offer the plaintiff
ajob. In this case, whether an employment opportunity existed may be better
understood as an intermediate variable rather than a covariate, thus
supporting an argument that a discriminatory factor was not preempted by
the "no open position" condition.1 8 7
In short, fundamental to assessing whether a discriminatory factor was
preempted by a legitimate purpose, and to determining causation more
generally, is the ability to think sharply about the causal problem.88 This is
accomplished by carefully identifying the primitives of the causal inquiry and
otherwise employing the potential-outcomes model to define the causal
question and structure the ensuing analysis.
3.

Developing Credible Statistical Evidence

Finally, the factorial framework's application of the potential-outcomes
model permits better use of statistical data for determining causal effects.
Indeed, the potential-outcomes model is a predominant framework for causal
inference in statistics and the sciences.1 8 9 Once a researcher has applied this
model to define the causal inquiry and its primitive elements, she can apply
the model to develop credible statistical evidence.
The primary concern of this Article is the standard of causation in
disparate-treatment claims and not the assessment of whether certain data
demonstrate satisfaction of this standard. It is therefore beyond the scope of
this Article to explain the many benefits of applying the potential-outcomes
framework to develop evidence of discrimination. Professor Greiner has
provided a detailed explanation in this regard.19 Suffice it to say, causalTwo main categories of preemptive legitimate purposes are those reflected in the
187.
McDonnellDouglastest and the factorial approach's prima facie case. However, others are possible
also.
188.

See Greiner, supra note 95, at 576-80.

189.

See generally Section III.C.

1go.

See Greiner, supra note 95.
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in the courtroom are frequently

outdated and not in line with modern techniques used in the sciences. More
broadly, there are very good arguments for employing the potential-outcomes
framework to prove or disprove discrimination statistically.191 Indeed, it is not
a stretch to say that current methods frequently lead to results that are simply
not credible, and that the potential-outcomes framework may allow credible
empirical analysis involving causal inference.92 Among other things, the
potential-outcomes framework provides a theory and method for deciding
how to treat variables that are relevant to the causal inquiry (such as
covariates), for understanding how to use data to make valuable comparisons,
and for interpreting a study's results in common-sense terms. 193 It also
facilitates neutral, unbiased-and, ultimately, more credible-analysis by
providing a framework in which the researcher can more easily specify
important decisions regarding the study's methodology prior to analyzing the
data.194 This prevents a wide range of questionable practices in which the
researcher can manipulate her methodology in order to obtain results that
favor her position. 195
Moreover, even if the potential-outcomes framework is not adopted for
purposes of analyzing data, employing the framework simply to structure the
causal inquiry-for example, defining primitives of the causal inquiry and
distinguishing covariates from intermediate variables-will benefit statistical
analyses that are performed to prove or disprove causation. This is because,
among the most damaging aspects of current methods of causal inference in
the courts is the absence of a concrete, common-sense structure for defining
suitable causal primitives and causal effects.19 6 Instead, litigators and courts
frequently rely blindly on regression analysis and "statistical minutiae," rather
than important substantive decisions regarding foundational elements of a
causal inquiry. 197
C.

THE ROLE OF DAMAGES IN PREVENTING WINDFALL RECOVERIES

In the proposed approach, the damages phase of the litigation plays an
important role in preventing windfall recoveries.
We are concerned here with windfall recoveries in a particular subset of
disparate-treatment cases. When a plaintiff fails to make her case per the proof

Id. at 5 3 5 - 3 9

-

191.

See Greiner, supra note 95; see also Hillel J. Bavli, Credibility in Empirical Legal Analysis
(SMU Dedman Sch. of L., Legal Studies Research Paper No. 434, 2020), https://ssrn.com/
abstract=3434095 [https://perma.cc/R7WD-RCHU]; Daniel E. Ho & Donald B. Rubin, Credible
CausalInference forEmpirical Legal Studies, 7 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 17 (201 i).
192.

193.
194.

Greiner, supranote 95, at 535-39.
Id.; see Bavli, supra note 192, at 28-36.

196.

See Bavli, supranote 192, at 9-20, 28-36; Ho & Rubin, supra note
Greiner, supra note 95, at 537-38.

197.

Id.

195.

192,

at 27-28.
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structure described above, there is no issue of windfall recovery. This includes
cases in which a plaintiff fails to prove that discrimination was a NESS cause
of the adverse employment action. It also includes cases in which a defendant
shows that a legitimate purpose preempted any discrimination-thus avoiding
the most extreme category of windfall recovery. In particular, the factorial
framework addresses directly, within its causal standard and as part of the
liability question, the most concerning form of windfall recovery: windfall
recovery that occurs when a legitimate purpose preempts the alleged
discrimination, such as when there is no open employment opportunity or
when the plaintiff fails to meet the minimal requirements for an opportunity.
In these situations, the discriminatory factor does not meet the factorial
framework's standard of causation. Finally, we are also not concerned here
with windfall recoveries (at least no more than in other torts actions) when a
defendant fails to establish a sufficient legitimate purpose, regardless of
whether discrimination is shown to be a NESS cause. This is because our
particular concern for windfall recoveries in the disparate-treatment context
arises from the possibility of two or more sufficient causes, where at least one
of which is legitimate.
What remains for consideration is the subset of cases that involve
concurrent multiple sufficient causes. Our concern here pertains to cases in
which the defendant establishes a sufficient legitimate purpose that is not
preemptive of the discriminatory factor, as well as a sufficient discriminatory
factor. A typical example involves a case in which both the plaintiffs race and
the plaintiffs poor job performance are factors sufficient for the nonpromotion of the plaintiff. Pursuant to the factorial approach, the plaintiff
could prove his case, notwithstanding a concurrent sufficient legitimate
factor, by showing that, in the absence of the legitimate factor (his poor job
performance) his race would have made the difference between being
promoted and not being promoted. Although we are interested in
disincentivizing the employer's discriminatory behavior, liability in such a case
gives rise to windfall-recovery concerns because the plaintiffs poor
performance alone would have been sufficient to prevent him from receiving
a promotion. Allowing him to recover could therefore have various distorting
effects on the incentives of employees and employers.9 8
Although potential windfalls resulting from preemptive causation are
better addressed in the liability phase as a matter of causation, the damages
phase of the litigation provides an appropriate structure for preventing this
latter category of windfall recoveries. Using damages to prevent such
recoveries does not detract from antidiscrimination law's deterrence or

198. See generally Babb v. Wilkie, 140 S. Ct. 1i68, 1177-78 (2020) ("Remedies should not put
a plaintiff in a more favorable position than he or she would have enjoyed absent
discrimination.").
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fairness objectives. To the contrary, it is well-aligned with them. Moreover,
using damages calculations to prevent windfall recoveries is well-aligned with
the role of damages in tort law generally.
In computing damages, there are various ways to account for a legitimate
purpose to mitigate the harms associated with windfall recoveries.99 An indepth discussion of possible approaches is beyond the scope of this Article.
My purpose here, however, is to show that good approaches are available. One
possibility is to view legitimate and discriminatory purposes as two factors in a
damages framework similar to a comparative-negligence scheme.00 Applying
such a framework, the jury could apportion damages according to some
measure of responsibility, and a court could apply jury instructions that, for
example, incorporate concerns for compensating the plaintiff and deterring
discrimination, as well as concerns regarding windfall recoveries.
It is important to realize that requiring a logical causal framework in the
liability stage of the litigation does not imply that the same framework must
be applied in the damages stage. There is nothing that limits a damages
computation to be determined only by concerns regarding causation. It is
reasonable for it to be affected by a range of policy concerns.
On the other hand, there is logic in apportioning damages based on
causation. In line with this logic, there are rigorous methods for making such
apportionments using the potential-outcomes framework, even in msc
situations. These methods can be based on unconditional, as well as
conditional, effects. For example, a court may calculate damages based, at
least in part, on the unconditional main effects of a protected feature,
averaged over legitimate factors; or, similarly, based on the proportion of
factor sets (or treatment combinations) involving the protected feature for
which the protected feature is a necessary condition for the sufficiency of a
set with respect to the adverse employment decision.
Assume, for example, that a female employee is paid less than her male
colleague because of her sex and because of her job performance, each of
which is a sufficient condition for her lower pay. Damages can be computed
by considering four scenarios and associated potential outcomes: (1) those in

199.
One way of viewing windfall recoveries in discrimination cases is as follows: Allowing a
plaintiff to obtain a windfall recovery is necessary in order to deter discrimination. Moreover, a
defendant arguably obtains a windfall if he commits discrimination and is relieved from paying
damages because the plaintiff happened to be less qualified or a poor performer. Using this
model, a good damages calculation would properly balance these concerns. To the extent that
the factorial framework could be criticized for employing damages calculations to mitigate the
harmful effects associated with windfall recoveries, and balancing the foregoing concerns, rather
than altogether avoiding these effects through liability determinations, this issue arises in all
antidiscrimination proof schemes, since it reflects a tradeoff between windfalls for the plaintiff
and windfalls for the defendant. Alternatively, it involves a tradeoff between avoiding windfalls
and deterring discrimination.
2oo.

See Wright, supra note 55, at 1799 n.265; see also Clarke, supra note 148, at 783-85.
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which the employee is not discriminated against but in which she has poor
job performance; (2) those in which she is discriminated against but in which
she does not have poor job performance; (3) those in which she neither is
discriminated against nor has poor job performance; and (4) those in which
she both is discriminated against and has poor job performance (i.e., the
scenario that actually occurred).- For example, consider the potential
outcomes in the 2x2 matrix in Figure

5.

Figure 5. 2x2 matrix depicting potential outcomes associated with
combinations of two factors, sex and performance, each with two levels

Male

Female

Strong Performance

$32

$24

Weak Performance

$26

$i6

If the evidence leads the factfinder to arrive at these pay values, a
damages calculation can be based on a main-effects analysis for the causal
effect of "Female" versus "Male." This would involve a contrast between the
values in the right column and the values in the left column of the 2x2 matrix.
As a simple example, a court may apportion damages based on the
average difference between the "Male" values and "Female" values:
$29 - $20 = $g (per hour). Contrast this $g/hour value with one based simply
on a comparison between the employee's pay ($16) and that of her male
colleague ($32), which would lead to a calculation based on the value

$32-$16=$16.
A main-effects analysis can similarly apply for binary variables, such as
promotion status. For example, if, instead of pay, the adverse employment
decision was non-promotion, and the potential outcomes are found to consist
of those in Figure 6, a damages calculation could similarly be based on a maineffects analysis that compares the proportion of factor sets, or treatment
combinations, for which the adverse decision occurs when sex = Female to the
proportion of treatment combinations for which the adverse decision occurs
when sex = Male. Using the potential outcomes in Figure 6, the calculation
would be based on the fact that promotion occurs in zero percent of the
treatment combinations when sex = Female as compared to 50 percent when

201.
See Donald B. Rubin, Estimating the Causal Effects of Smoking, 20 STAT. MED. 1395, 1410
-12 (2001) (examining the causal effects of alleged misconduct by the tobacco industry, and
analyzing damages apportionment through consideration of "counterfactual worlds" when there
are allegations of two "distinct sources of alleged misconduct"-misconduct by the tobacco
industry and misconduct by the asbestos industry).
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sex = Male.202 In NESS terms, the calculation could be based on the
proportion of factor sets with sex = Female for which sex = Female is a
necessary condition for the sufficiency of a set with respect to the adverse
employment decision "Not Promoted."
Figure 6. 2x2 matrix depicting (binary) potential outcomes associated with
combinations of two factors, sex and performance, each with two levels

Male

Female

Strong Performance

Promoted

Not Promoted

Weak Performance

Not Promoted

Not Promoted

Suffice it to say that in addition to preventing the most concerning form
of windfall recovery by precluding causation when a legitimate purpose
preempts a discriminatory factor, courts employing the factorial approach can
use damages as a tool for further mitigating the harmful effects of windfall
recoveries.
V.

IMPLICATIONS

The factorial framework carries a wide range of implications for
disparate-treatment claims and antidiscrimination law generally. In this Part,
however, I focus on two important implications in particular. First, in Section
V.A, I build on the discussion above to argue explicitly that the factorial
approach yields results that are more consistent with antidiscrimination law's
policy objectives, and its deterrence objectives in particular, than either the
motivating-factor test or the but-for test. Although the analysis herein involves
antidiscrimination law's fairness (and compensation) aims also, I focus
primarily on its deterrence objectives because the implications for these
objectives flow less directly and are less apparent from the analysis elsewhere
in this Article. Then, in Section V.B, I explain how, contrary to current
methods, the proposed framework addresses the state of disarray surrounding
causation in antidiscrimination law by simultaneously satisfying the causal
language in antidiscrimination statutes and fulfilling Congress's broader aims
in enacting these statutes-a task not possible using methods based on the
motivating-factor or but-for tests.
A.

THE DETERRENCE OBJECTIVES OFANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW

The factorial approach refines causation standards in discrimination
cases. As discussed in Part II, these standards lack consistency and are

202.

See supra Section III.C; CounterfactualCausation, supranote 15, at 905--11.
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inadequate in various important respects. The factorial framework, on the
other hand, supplies a standard that fulfills the policy goals of
antidiscrimination law, reflects dominant notions of actual cause and effect,
and permits a logical and practical approach that can be applied consistently
throughout the various areas of antidiscrimination law.
The factorial framework blends three innovations to accomplish a
coherent and comprehensive standard. It employs: (1) the potentialoutcomes model as a central structure in which to define and analyze the
causal inquiry; (2) a main-effects analysis, and the NESS test in particular as
its causal estimand; and (3) a legal framework grounded in tort law and recent
innovations regarding multiple sufficient causes. In the previous parts of this
Article, I have discussed benefits associated with each of these elements. In
this Section, I discuss the implications of the factorial approach for
antidiscrimination law's primary policy objective-deterring discrimination
and, more broadly, encouraging socially desirable behavior.
The precise role of factual causation in fulfilling the law's policy
objectives is complex. "A common belief... is that policy considerations have
no role to play in the determination of cause-in-fact, 'because no policy can
be strong enough to warrant the imposition of liability for loss to which the
defendant's conduct has not in fact contributed.'"-3 The requirement of a
causal link between misconduct and harm is at least firmly grounded in policy
objectives of fairness and compensation. It is a well-accepted principle of tort
law that individuals should only be held liable for harm that they have caused,
and that individuals should only receive compensation grounded in tort for
misconduct that has made some difference-that has been outcome
determinative in some respect or other.204 However, the role of causation in

deterring harmful behavior, or more generally, in producing socially optimal
behavior, has been more controversial. Law-and-economics scholars have long
debated the role of factual causation in creating incentives for socially
desirable behavior, or whether causation is even necessary for achieving such
objectives in the first instance.05
In this Article, I take the position that antidiscrimination law seeks to
accomplish a number of policy aims, including, most prominently, the goals
of deterrence and fairness.20 6 I assume that causation is of fundamental

Viator, supranote 77, at 1526-27 (quoting JOHN G. FLEMING, THE LAW OF TORTS 170
203.
(6th ed. 1983)).
204.

See CounterfactualCausation, supra note 15, at 892-93 1111.49-52 and accompanying text.

205.
See generally LANDES & POSNER, supra note 77; Landes & Posner, supra note 77; Shavell,
supra note 77; Calabresi, supranote 77.

206. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 264-65 (1989) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) ("Like the common law of torts, the statutory employment 'tort' created by Title VII
has two basic purposes. The first is to deter conduct which has been identified as contrary to
public policy and harmful to society as a whole. As we have noted in the past, the award of backpay
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importance to the policy objectives of tort law and antidiscrimination law in
particular. This assumption is strongly supported by case law and scholarship,
whether the importance of causation is rooted only in notions of fairness or
also in deterrence theories.07

I therefore consider the implications of the factorial framework for the
law's deterrence objectives, but with the important constraint that factual
causation is a requirement of liability. In other words, I assume that, based at
least on fairness and other non-deterrence objectives of antidiscrimination law
-if not deterrence objectives also-a standard of causation that meaningfully
reflects actual, common, and scientific cause and effect is necessary. The
question is, what standard to apply?
Additionally, I consider a range of deterrence objectives that reflect,
more broadly, aims of producing socially desirable behavior rather than
simply deterring discrimination. Tort law seeks to deter misconduct by
potential tortfeasors, but it also seeks to prevent overdeterrence and other
socially undesirable "side effects," such as distorting the incentives of potential
tort victims to take appropriate levels of precaution. I assume that this concern
for the larger picture-for incentivizing socially desirable behavior, rather
than simply maximizing deterrence of a particular form of misconduct-also
applies to the special case of antidiscrimination law.
1.

The Motivating-Factor Test

Once one accepts the premise that a standard of factual causation is
necessary and that it should reflect actual cause and effect, the motivatingfactor test cannot be accepted as a legitimate standard of causation. It
effectively does away with the causation requirement.-I Furthermore, even if
it is assumed that the motivating-factor test reflects actual cause and effect,
the test cannot be a satisfactory test of causation for two other related reasons.
First, the motivating-factor test is vague, and it leaves the causal
determination to the impulses ofjurors-whether in favor of a plaintiff or a

to a Title VII plaintiff provides 'the spur or catalyst which causes employers and unions to selfexamine and to self-evaluate their employment practices and to endeavor to eliminate, so far as
possible, the last vestiges' of discrimination in employment. The second goal of Title VII is 'to
make persons whole for injuries suffered on account of unlawful employment discrimination."'
(citations omitted) (quoting Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417-18 (1975))).
See supra Section IIA; David W. Robertson, Causation in the Restatement (Third) of
207.
Torts: Three Arguable Mistakes, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1007, ioo8 (2oog) ("[T] he cause-in-fact
requirement is the 'linchpin' of the corrective-justice theory. Indeed, it has long been regarded
as a truism that 'a defendant should never be held liable to a plaintiff for a loss where it appears
that his wrong did not contribute to it, and no policy or moral consideration can be strong
enough to warrant the imposition of liability in such [a] case."' (second alteration in original)
(first quoting Larry A. Alexander, Causationand CorrectiveJustice:Does Tort Law Make Sense?, 6 LAW
& PHIL. 1, 12 (1987); then quoting Charles E. Carpenter, ConcurrentCausation, 83 U. PA. L. REV.
941, 947 (1935))); see also Counterfactual Causation, supra note 15, at 884-85 11.14 and
accompanying text.
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defendant. As such, it is likely to cause substantial uncertainty and a range of
other undesirable effects that are avoidable with standards that provide more
structure for the causal determination. The uncertainty that the motivatingfactor test generates may have a range of unintended effects on employee and
employer incentives. These include, for example, overdeterrence in the form

of raising the costs of employment for potential employers-including
insurance costs and social and financial risks for employers-and thereby
causing fewer jobs and job-related opportunities. The uncertainty
surrounding the standard of causation may also lead to suboptimal levels of
litigation.
Second, overlapping with the issue of vagueness is the concern that the
motivating-factor test is overbroad in the sense that it may allow a finding of
causation even in circumstances in which an employer did not intend to
discriminate. This overbreadth may also give rise to socially undesirable
behavior. In particular, it may cause a range of unintended and detrimental
effects on the incentives of employees and employers. For example, if an
employer has been accused of committing discrimination in the past, he may
avoid creating new jobs, giving promotions, or selecting employees (or
perhaps even selecting certain employees) for opportunities in order to avoid
potential exposure to liability based on his employment decisions, even if he
has no intention of committing discriminatory behavior. This overdeterrence may
occur because, under the motivating-factor test, evidence of his earlier
discriminatory acts may be used, and may be sufficient, to show discrimination
in his employment decision, even if he is able to prove that the applicants'
qualifications were entirely determinative of his employment decision.09
Of course, a certain level of fear of legal exposure is ideal. This is how
deterrence works. The law intends to threaten legal exposure for employers

who discriminate. However, too much fear-such that the threat of liability
deters not only discriminatory conduct, but also non-discriminatory, socially
beneficial conduct-is counterproductive. In the extreme case, overdeterrence
can eliminate jobs altogether, even when an employer has no intention to
discriminate.
Finally, for both the vagueness and overbreadth issues discussed above, it
is important to realize that overdeterrence constitutes only one category of

the harms produced by the motivating-factor test. Another category pertains
to underenforcement and underdeterrence. The motivating-factor test provides
juries with little guidance and allows them great flexibility to arrive at
decisions they find appropriate. In some cases, ajury may find an employer to
have acted appropriately where, in fact, the employer acted discriminatorily.

og. See generally Hillel J. Bavli, An Aggregation Theory of Character Evidence (SMU Dediman Sch.
of L., Legal Studies Research Paper No. 483, 2020), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3664837
[https://perma.cc/Q 4 RQ-NK 7 G] (discussing other-acts character evidence, including evidence
of prior discriminatory acts).
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Ajury in one part of the country may be far more likely to view certain conduct
as discriminatory than ajury in another part of the country.
Moreover, an employer may be underdeterredif he believes that a jury is
unlikely to hold him responsible for his discriminatory conduct. Because the
motivating-factor test leaves the decision to the intuition of the jury, juries may
rule with reference to their personal norms and intuitions, rather than the

law's aims. It may be difficult for courts to control this tendency or overturn
verdicts when the motivating-factor test sanctions this flexibility.
Thus, it is likely that the motivating-factor test both overdeters and
underdeters, and that it creates poor incentives for both employers and
employees, due to its inherent vagueness and its focus on forces that may
"motivate" employer conduct rather than on the notion of "making a
difference" employed in well-established conceptions of cause and effect.
2.

But-For Causation

On the other hand, the but-for test also fails to accomplish optimal
deterrence. As discussed, it has many advantages: it is simple and
straightforward, it employs an explicit analytical process, and it reflects actual
cause and effect. Its major weakness, however, is that it underdeters
discriminatory conduct by allowing employers to evade liability through
arguments that there were sufficient legitimate causes.
Consider, for example, a scenario in which an employer was hiring a new
employee for his business. Two individuals submitted applications for the
position-a white applicant, who was incidentally very well-qualified for the
position, and an African-American applicant, who was incidentally not wellqualified for the position. Upon interviewing the African-American applicant,
however, the employer made no reference to the applicants' qualifications.
Instead, the employer made it clear that he simply would not hire a non-white
applicant.
The antidiscrimination laws undoubtedly aim to deter such behavior.
However, it is unlikely that the employer's conduct would give rise to liability
under the but-for test because in the absence of the employer's discriminatory
conduct, the employer is very unlikely to have hired the African-American
applicant anyway. Knowing this, employers are likely to be more willing to
engage in various forms of discriminatory behavior.
3.

The Factorial Framework

The factorial framework addresses the deterrence problems discussed
above in a straightforward way. It employs the NESS estimand, which asks
whether the discriminatory conduct was necessary for the sufficiency of a set
of factors for the occurrence of the adverse employment decision. Using the
formulation in the Restatement (Third) of Torts, the NESS estimand applies
to the foregoing scenario to require the following finding of fact: had the
candidates been similarly qualified, would the plaintiffs race have made a

2021]
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difference in the employer's employment decision-would the plaintiff being
African American versus white be likely to have made a difference? The
answer to this question, in light of the facts above, is clearly "yes." Therefore,
applying the factorial framework, the employer's discriminatory conduct is a
cause of the adverse employment action.
Note that implicit in this analysis are numerous decisions that would
require careful thought using the potential-outcomes framework-for
example, whether the treatment levels associated with the factor "race" consist
of "white" and "non-white" or "white" and "African American," and whether
the plaintiff's poor qualifications constitute sufficient covariates and preempted
the employer's discrimination by failing to meet minimal requirements.210
As the example above demonstrates, the NESS test leads to liability in
certain situations in which the but-for test underdeters. It addresses the butfor test's underenforcement problem. Let us now consider how the NESS test
would operate in an example referred to above to demonstrate the
motivating-factor test's overenforcement and overdeterrence problems.211
Assume that an employer has been accused of discriminatory behavior in the
past and, although he has no intention to discriminate in seeking a new
employee, he is hesitant to establish a new position because he fears that
allegations of his past discriminatory conduct may be used to prove that race
permeated his employment decision. He fears that, under the motivatingfactor test, he may be found liable for discrimination even if he avoids any and
all discriminatory behavior. This is problematic for the reasons discussed
above.212 However, unlike the motivating-factor test, the NESS test avoids this
concern, or at least accounts for it while balancing concerns regarding an
overly stringent causation standard.
Again using the Restatement (Third)'s formulation, the NESS test would
ask whether, absent differences in qualifications, race would have made a
difference. Unlike the motivating-factor test, which may, based on allegations
regarding the employer's past behavior, identify race as a factor that
"motivated" his employment decision, the NESS test would require evidence
that race would have made a difference. Without more, the allegations regarding
the employer's past discriminatory behavior would likely be insufficient for a
finding of causation using the NESS test. The factorial approach thus avoids
certain overenforcement and overdeterrence concerns associated with this
type of situation. Employing the potential-outcomes framework and the NESS
test as its estimand, the proposed approach, while not requiring a different
actual outcome, requires a difference in potential outcomes-in what would
have happened.

2 io.
2 1 1.
2 12.

See supra Section I.B.
See supra Section V.A.
See supra Section V.A.

1.
1.
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In short, the factorial approach satisfies the criterion that a standard of
causation follow the notion of actual cause and effect. At the same time, it
does not suffer from the underenforcement and underdeterrence weaknesses

of the but-for test. It also addresses the vagueness concerns and the substantial
enforcement and deterrence problems associated with the motivating-factor
test by providing a concrete measure of causation based on the counterfactual
model and the necessity condition.3 Finally, through careful design of the

causal inquiry using the potential-outcomes framework, the factorial
approach avoids overdeterrence and other socially undesirable effects that
result from misclassifying a factor as a cause of an adverse employment action
when such a factor is altogether preempted by a legitimate cause.
4.

Effect Categories

Based on the above argument, it seems beneficial to rule out the
motivating-factor and but-for tests in favor of the factorial framework.
However, let us also consider a categorization of effects under the motivatingfactor, but-for, and NESS tests to better understand the relationship between
these tests and the benefits of the factorial framework.
Consider two categories of cases for which the results of the motivatingfactor test and the but-for test differ from the results of the factorial approach.
First, consider cases that exist within the nebulous area between the fuzzy
threshold for satisfying the motivating-factor test and the threshold for a
minimum level of "difference" that a protected feature can make-i.e., NESS.
These are cases that satisfy the motivating-factor test but not the NESS test or
the but-for test. These cases involve circumstances in which the protected
feature did not even make a hypothetical difference, let alone an actual
difference. They include circumstances in which a protected feature played

Note that the proposed approach to causation may also have a wide range of
213.
implications for other areas of antidiscrimination law. For example, it may have important
implications for disparate-treatment class actions. By providing a theory of counterfactual
causation that is less stringent than the but-for test, on the one hand, and, in a sense, less
individualistic than the motivating-factor test, on the other hand, the factorial framework may
allow class treatment in contexts in which such treatment is currently foreclosed. It may also
facilitate class treatment by enabling certain statistical methods, grounded in the potentialoutcomes framework, for developing evidence of a "pattern or practice" of discrimination. See
generally LINDEMANN ET AL., supra note 8, at 2-114-19. Indeed, it may have broader implications
for proving pattern-or-practice cases-where a plaintiff seeks to show "a pattern or practice of
disparate treatment"-and for burden-shifting schemes currently used in those cases. Id. at 2-115.
Finally, the factorial framework may have implications for disparate impact cases, in which "an
employer's facially neutral policy or practice may be unlawful-even absent a showing of
discriminatory intent-if it has a significant disparate impact on a protected group." Id. at 3-2
(citing Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430-32 (1971)). In these cases, once a plaintiff
has established a prima facie case involving disparate consequences of an employer's policy or
practice, "the employer may defend its policy or practice by proving that it is job related for the
position in question and consistent with business necessity."' Id. at 3-2, 3-37 (quoting 42 U.S.C.
§ 20ooe-2(k) (1) (A) (i) (2o18)).
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such an insignificant role, if any at all, that, even in the absence of the other
factors (e.g., even if two applicants had been equally qualified), the protected
feature would not have made a difference in the outcome of the employment
decision.
For the reasons discussed above, findings of causation for this category of
cases are not optimal. Even if there is some deterrence benefit associated with
findings of causation in these cases, there is little question that the harmful
effects associated with the ambiguity surrounding these findings under the
motivating-factor test, combined with the harmful effects of overdeterrence,
would outweigh any theoretical benefit.
Second, consider a category of cases that do not meet the but-for
standard, but that do meet the NESS standard. In particular, consider a
subcategory of these cases for which the motivating-factor test provides ajury
with flexibility to find no discrimination even when discrimination constitutes
a NESS cause. Findings of no liability in these cases, however, seem out of line
with the intention of the motivating-factor test based on the test's own
premise. After all, it is a form of the substantial-factor test in tort law, a test
developed to find causation in msc situations when the but-for test could not.
It is only through the vague nature of the motivating-factor test that a jury
could render a finding of no causation under this test even when the alleged
discrimination is a NESS cause of an adverse employment action. It is at least
reasonable, if not necessary, to conclude that, even by the motivating-factor
test's own measures and objectives, the factorial approach is preferable in
these situations.
Let us continue to consider the category of cases that satisfy the NESS test
but not the but-for test, but now with reference to the but-for test rather than

the motivating-factor test. First, it seems almost obvious, or at least wellaccepted, that enabling findings of liability in mixed-motive cases would serve
the law's deterrence objectives. This conclusion is based on the near-universal
rejection of the but-for standard in msc situations in tort law-a field of law
that is particularly concerned with deterrence and incentivizing socially
optimal behavior-and the substantial concern, articulated repeatedly by
Congress, courts, and scholars, for deterring discriminatory behavior, even
when that behavior is accompanied by sufficient legitimate purposes.21 4
As Justice O'Connor emphasized in her concurring opinion in Price
Waterhouse, "There is no doubt that Congress considered reliance on gender
or race in making employment decisions an evil in itself."215 Moreover, the
"Court's decisions under the Equal Protection Clause have long recognized

214.

See supra Part II.

215.
See
concurring)
opportunity,
evaluated by

Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 264-65 (1989) (O'Connor, J.,
(opining further that "[w]hile the main concern of [Title VII] was with employment
Congress was certainly not blind to the stigmatic harm which comes from being
a process which treats one as an inferior by reason of one's race or sex").
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that whatever the final outcome of a decisional process, the inclusion of race
or sex as a consideration within it harms both society and the individual."1 6
Therefore, "[w]here an individual disparate treatment plaintiff has shown by
a preponderance of the evidence that an illegitimate criterion was a substantial
factorin an adverse employment decision, the deterrent purpose of the statute
has clearly been triggered."217
Thus, as discussed above, and confirmed by Justice O'Connor's opinion,
the but-for test underdeters, and the NESS test is preferable in this respect.
The next question to ask, however, is whether the NESS test overdeters.
Remember, we are not examining the general dangers of overdeterrence in
disparate-treatment cases; rather, we are interested particularly in the
overdeterrence that results from allowing liability in cases in which
discrimination, although not a but-for cause, is a cause under the NESS test.
This may occur, for example, where, in the absence of a sufficient legitimate
factor, being male rather than female would have made the difference
between being hired and not hired. But this category of cases consists of
causes-multiple sufficient causes-that are decidedly underdeterred.1 8 This
much is clear from Supreme Court decisions and a long tradition of
exceptions to but-for causation for cases involving multiple sufficient
causes.21 9 On the other hand, the NESS test is substantially less stringent than
the but-for test, and with its added flexibility comes the potential for
overdeterrence.
The NESS estimand has the potential to create suboptimal incentives by
allowing windfall recoveries when, for example, an employee fails to meet
minimal requirements for an employment opportunity, or when an adverse
employment decision is a result of a plaintiff acting inappropriately or
unproductively at work-although also a result of discrimination. As discussed
above, the factorial framework addresses the potential for suboptimal
incentives associated with this subset of cases in two ways.220 First, the factorial
framework precludes a finding of causation when the adverse employment
decision is the result of a sufficient covariate-that is, when the discriminatory
force is preempted by another force. Second, windfall recoveries that result
from applying the NESS test to discrimination that is accompanied by a
nonpreemptive sufficient legitimate factor can be mitigated (or optimized22l)

216.
Id. at 265 (citing Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989)). Interestingly,
Justice O'Connor's opinion continues by highlighting that "Congress clearly conditioned legal
liability on a determination that the consideration of an illegitimate factor caused a tangible
employment injury of some kind." Id.
217.

Id.

218.

See supranotes 2 14-17 and accompanying text.

219.

See supraPart II.

22o.

See supra Sections IV.B-.C.

221.

See supranote 199.
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with an appropriate damages calculation. To be sure, employing damages
calculations as a method for mitigating windfall recoveries is not perfect. For
example, it lacks precision. However, it is flexible, and it is arguably the best
of imperfect alternatives. Moreover, there is strong precedent for such
calculations from the broader torts context.222
B.

CAUSAL LANGUAGE INANTIDISCRIMINATION STATUTES

Antidiscrimination statutes generally contain causal language that courts
have held to require a but-for standard. For example, the Supreme Court held
in Gross v. FBL FinancialServices, Inc. that the ordinary meaning of the ADEA's
language, that an employer is liable for discrimination against an individual
"because of such individual's age," is "by reason of' or "on account of' age
-i.e., "that age was the 'but-for' cause of the employer's adverse decision."223
The Court distinguished Price Waterhouse and rejected the argument that the
Court should apply Title VII's burden-shifting proof scheme, highlighting
"textual differences between Title VII and the ADEA" and Congress's choice
to incorporate the burden-shifting scheme in the former statute while not in
the latter.224

In University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar, the Supreme
Court similarly held that Title VII's antiretaliation provision's use of the term
"because" implies that "Title VII retaliation claims require proof that the
desire to retaliate was the but-for cause of the challenged employment
action."225

The causal language in these and other antidiscrimination statutes have
caused immense confusion.22 6 As the cases above suggest, there have been
multiple Supreme Court decisions regarding whether such language in
antidiscrimination statutes requires a but-for standard or permits a motivatingfactor standard. Indeed, the Supreme Court recently handed down two

222.

See supranotes 2oo-01 and accompanying text.

Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 176 (2009) (quoting 1 WEBSTER'S THIRD
223.
NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 194 (1966)).
224.
Id. at 173-75 n.2; Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 350-51 (2013)
(internal quotation marks omitted). Title VII also involves a but-for standard, but only as part of
a more complex proof scheme. See supra Section II.A.
225.

Nassar, 570 U.S. at 352.

226.
Consider, for example, the causal language of the ADA. As with other statutes, courts
vary significantly as to whether the ADA's "on the basis of' language implies a but-for standard or
permits a motivating-factor standard. See Parker v. Sony Pictures Ent., Inc., 26o F. 3 d 100, 105
-o8 (2d Cir. 2001); Serwatka v. Rockwell Automation Inc., 591 F. 3 d 957, 961-64 ( 7 th Cir. 2010);
Gulliford v. Schilli Transp. Servs., Inc., No 4 :1 5 -CV-1 9 -PRC, 2017 WL 1547301, at *6 (N.D.
Ind. Apr. 27, 2017); see also Counterfactual Causation, supra note 15, at 930 n.152 and
accompanying text; LINDEMANN ET AL., supranote 8, at 13-197-99.
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decisions regarding the meaning of causal language in antidiscrimination
statutes and its implications for causation."7
The reason for this turmoil is simple: the causal language in these statutes
is thought to imply but-for causation, whereas good policy, common sense,
and the intent of Congress is thought to require a less stringent standard. In
other words, there is substantial discordance between the statutes' causal
language, as it is currently understood, and the broader intent of Congress.
The factorial approach addresses this discordance. Through the
potential-outcomes framework and the NESS estimand, it provides a causal
measure that is consistent with both the causal language of the
antidiscrimination statutes on the one hand, and good policy and the intent
of Congress on the other.228 This harmonization is reflected in this Article's
characterization of the factorial framework as a refinement of both the butfor test and the motivating-factor test.
For example, a central issue in cases recently decided by the Supreme
Court is whether, pursuant to causal statutory language, the alleged
discriminatory conduct must have "made a difference" in order to satisfy
causation.22 9 In these decisions, the Court presumes that requiring this
necessity condition implies a but-for standard and precludes the motivatingfactor test. However, the factorial framework rejects this presumption. A
central feature of the proposed approach is the notion that a force may make
a difference-it may fulfill the necessity condition-without going so far as to
satisfy the but-for standard. Pursuant to this approach, a logical and effective
standard of causation may indeed require the necessity condition, but in a less
stringent form than the but-for test.

My argument here relies on two components: (1) the ordinary meaning
of the causal language in antidiscrimination statutes reflects the ordinary
meaning of cause and effect, which, in turn, is intended to capture the
scientific meaning of cause and effect, including both conditional effects and
unconditional effects, and the NESS estimand in particular; and (2) the
factorial framework is consistent with good policy and Congress's intent.
First, as explained in Counterfactual Causation, the ordinary meaning of
causal language such as "because of' and "on the basis of' is easily interpreted
as capturing the broader meaning of causation that includes both conditional
effects and unconditional effects.230 The Court "begin [s] with the language
employed by Congress and the assumption that the ordinary meaning of that

227.
See Babb v. Wilkie, 140 S. Ct. 1i68 (2020); Comcast Corp. v. Nat'l Ass'n of Afr.
Am.-Owned Media, 140 S. Ct. ioog (2020); see also Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731
(202o); infra Section V.C.
See CounterfactualCausation, supra note 15, at 925-32.
228.
229.

See Babb, 140 S. Ct. at i172; Comcast Corp., 140 S. Ct. at 1013-14.

230.

CounterfactualCausation, supra note 15, at go.
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31 and to determine

the ordinary meaning of terms in a statute, the Court examines their entries

in well-established dictionaries.232 Further, it is clear from the Supreme
Court's analysis of causal statutory language such as "because of," "on the basis
of," and "results from" that the Court's interpretation of those terms is based
on the common meaning of cause and effect. For example, in Burragev. United
States, a criminal case involving the Controlled Substances Act, the Court
interpreted the ordinary meaning of the Act's "results from" language,
stating:
A thing "results" when it "[a]rise [s] as an effect, issue, or outcome
from some action, process or design." 2 The New Shorter Oxford
English Dictionary 2570 (1993). "Results from" imposes, in other
words, a requirement of actual causality. "In the usual course," this
requires proof "'that the harm would not have occurred' in the
absence of-that is, but for-the defendant's conduct." University of
Tex. Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar, 570 U.S.
,
,133
S. Ct. 2517, 2525, 186 L.Ed.2d 503 (2013) (quoting Restatement of
Torts @ 431, Comment a (1934)) -233
Similarly, in Gross, the Court held that "because of ... age" means "that age
was the 'reason' that the employer decided to act."234 Terms such as "because
of," "on the basis of," and "results from" imply a requirement of actual cause
and effect, which, in turn, courts interpret to mean but-for causation.235
But, let us now consider whether actual cause and effect in fact implies
but-for causation. Examining dictionary entries for the term "causation"
reveals that the ordinary meaning of the term is intended to capture, or is at
least extremely well correlated with, the scientific concept of cause and effect,
which includes both conditional and unconditional effects.23 6 For example,
Merriam-Webster defines "causation" as "the act or process of causing"; "the
act or agency which produces an effect."237 Oxford Dictionaries defines the
term as "[t]he action of causing something"; "[t]he relationship between

231.
Engine Mfrs. Ass'n v. S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 541 U.S. 246, 252 (2004)
(quoting Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 194 (1985)).

233.

CounterfactualCausation, supranote 15, at 9o2 (citing Burrage v. United States,
(2014); Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 176 (2009)).
Burrage, 571 U.S. at 210-11.

234.

Gross, 557 U.S. at 176.

232.

571

U.S.

204, 210-11

235.
See Burrage, 571 U.S. at 211-12 ("[C]ourts regularly read phrases like 'results from' to
require but-for causality.").
236.

CounterfactualCausation, supra note 15, at 903.

237.
Causation, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merrian-webster.com/dictionary/causation
[https://perma.cc/77EJ-5WKXI.
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cause and effect; causality."23 8 Most significantly, the primary usage examples
of this term provided by Merriam-Webster are "the role of heredity in the
causation of cancer," and "in a complex situation causation is likely to be
multiple"; and those provided by Oxford Dictionaries are "investigating the
role of nitrate in the causation of cancer," and "a strong association is not a
proof of causation."239
It is clear from these entries in well-established dictionaries-regularly
referred to by the Supreme Court and lower courts to determine the ordinary
meaning of causal and other statutory language-that the ordinary meaning
of the causal language in antidiscrimination statutes incorporates the
scientific meaning of cause and effect, which is broader than but-for
causation. It includes both conditional effects (and but-for causation in
particular) and unconditional effects, including the NESS estimand.24
Importantly, as emphasized above, neither the ordinary meaning nor the
scientific meaning of causation includes the motivating-factor test.2 4
However, the ordinary and scientific meaning of causation is broader than
the but-for test: it includes the broader meaning of "making a difference"
-of the necessity condition-reflected in a main-effects analysis.242
This is not to say that courts have necessarily been incorrect to interpret
the ordinary meaning of causal statutory language to mean but-for causation.
In this Article, I define but-for causation consistently with its common
understanding in law-as a specific conditional effect within the broader
counterfactual model.243 However, the key component of the but-for test is
the necessity condition, the condition that, in one form or another, the factor
made a difference. This component reflects a comparison of potential
outcomes. It is central to both conditional effects and unconditional effects.
Therefore, when the courts apply but-for causation to reflect the ordinary
meaning of cause and effect, they may simply intend to apply the concept of
the necessity condition, which, in turn, applies to unconditional effects as well
as conditional effects.
Similarly, when Congress uses causal language in antidiscrimination
statutes, it is likely referring to the broader necessity condition rather than
the narrow conditional effect I (and courts) have called but-for causation.
Whether Congress was aware of this broader meaning or not, it is likely to
have intended it. The broader meaning within the counterfactual framework

238.
Causation, LEXICO, https://www.lexico.com/en/definition/causation
QFE8-6GGX]; see CounterfactualCausation, supra note 15, at 903.
239.

MERRIAM-WEBSTER, supranote 237; LEXICO, supra note 238; see CounterfactualCausation,

supra note 15, at 903.
240.
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See CounterfactualCausation, supra note 15, at 903, 927-32.
See supra Sections II.B, IIlA.
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See supra Sections III.C-.E.
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is in fact captured by the "ordinary" meaning of cause and effect. Moreover,
as suggested by courts and scholars-at least implicitly-Congress's objectives
in enacting the antidiscrimination laws are better served by a causal standard
reflecting a broader meaning of the necessity condition.44
Indeed, the discordance between the Supreme Court's interpretation of
Congress's causal language as implying the but-for standard, on the one hand,
and good policy and Congress's objectives in enacting the antidiscrimination
statutes, on the other hand, is likely the primary reason for the state of disarray
surrounding this area of the law. The theory and methodology provided by
the factorial framework resolves this discordance. As explained in Part III, the
broader meaning of counterfactual causation reflected in a main-effects
analysis, and the NESS estimand in particular, comports with good policy and
Congress's likely intent.
C.

ANAPPLICATION: THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISIONS INCOMCAST AND BABB

In 2020, the Supreme Court handed down two decisions regarding the
appropriate standard of causation in disparate-treatment cases. 245 In
Comcast Corporation v. National Association of African American-Owned Media,
Entertainment Studios Network (ESN), an operator of television networks,
and the National Association of African American-Owned Media sued
Comcast under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, alleging discrimination based on race in
"mak[ing] or enforc[ing] contracts."24 6 The Supreme Court, however,
unanimously ruled that a plaintiff bringing an action for discrimination under
42 U.S.C. § 1981 must prove that race was a but-for cause of the adverse
decision, and that the plaintiffs did not satisfy this standard.247
The Court reasoned that this "ancient and simple 'but for' common law
causation test ... supplies the 'default' or 'background' rule against which
Congress is normally presumed to have legislated," and that "[n]ormally
... the essential elements of a claim remain constant through the life of a
lawsuit."24 8 The Court held that, based on "the statute's text, its history, and
[the Court's] precedent .

..

@g81 follows the general rule."249 The Court

used similar reasoning as in earlier cases, drawing on the meaning of terms
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like "on account of," "by reason of," "on the basis of," and "because of," as well
as the default causation standard in tort law, to infer a but-for standard.250
In Babb v. Wilkie, the Supreme Court considered a claim brought under
29 U.S.C. § 633a(a), the federal-sector provision of the ADEA.251 The claim
was brought (among other discrimination claims not considered by the
Court) by Noris Babb, a clinical pharmacist at the Department of Veterans
Affairs Medical Center ("VA"), against her employer, the VA.252 Babb alleged
that, as a result of age discrimination, the VA took away a designation that
made her eligible for promotion, denied her certain training opportunities,
and reduced her holiday pay.253 She also alleged a number of age-related
comments made by her supervisors.254 In response, the VA alleged legitimate
reasons for the adverse employment actions.255
Unlike the Court's holding in Comcast, the Court held that, here, "age
need not be a but-for cause of an employment decision in order for there to
be a violation of [the statute]."256 The decision turned on the plain meaning
of the statute's text. The relevant portion of the ADEA provides: "All
personnel actions affecting employees or applicants for employment who are
at least 40 years of age ... shall be made free from any discrimination based
on age."257
The Court pieced apart the statute's language, interpreting each term
based on its plain dictionary meaning.258 It then analyzed the relationships
between the terms, and concluded that "age must be a but-for cause of
discrimination-that is, of differential treatment-but not necessarily a butfor cause of a personnel action itself."259 According to the Court, the
"straightforward meaning" of the statute "does not require proof that an
employment decision would have turned out differently if age had not been
taken into account."2 6o Rather, "[t] he plain meaning of the critical statutory

250.
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language ('made free from any discrimination based on age') demands that
personnel actions be untainted by any consideration of age."2 61
The Court illustrated its reasoning with an example involving an
employer that uses a point system to make promotion decisions: If a 55-yearold had a score of 85, and then a 5-point deduction based on age, whereas a
35-year-old had a score of go, and therefore would have received the
promotion regardless of the age-based point deduction, then the decision is
not made "free from any discrimination," even though the point deduction
ultimately did not change the outcome of the promotion decision.2 62
The Supreme Court concluded that a plaintiff who proves "unequal
consideration," but is unable to show but-for causation, may "seek injunctive
or other forward-looking relief," but "cannot obtain reinstatement, backpay,
compensatory damages, or other forms of relief related to the end result of
an employment decision."2 63
Both decisions are based primarily on the Court's interpretation of the
plain meaning of the statutes on which the respective claims are based. As in
earlier cases, the Court reads causal language such as "because of' and "based
on" to imply a but-for requirement.2 64 As discussed, this standard leads to
problems in disparate-treatment cases. However, as explained in the previous
Section, these terms likely entail a broader meaning-one more in line with

NESS than but-for causation. Moreover, this standard would not lead to the
problems associated with the but-for test, and therefore would not lead to
dissonance between the literal meaning of the statute's language on the one

hand, and good policy and Congress's likely intent on the other. For these
reasons, the factorial framework would likely provide a more appropriate
standard of causation in Comcast than the but-for test.
Moreover, respectfully, the Court's analysis in Babb is problematic in a
number of respects. The factorial framework provides a theory and standard
that resolves these issues. First, the Court's "any-consideration" standard2 65
does notjibe easily with modern conceptions of cause and effect. It is a form
of the motivating-factor test and is subject to all of the same criticisms that
apply to that test generally. The any-consideration test that the Court
illustrates in its example is a standard of behavior, not one of causation.
Causation is the element of a legal claim that links misconduct with harm.2 66
An employer who considers age in making an employment decision-such as
the 5-point deduction in the Supreme Court's example-has committed an

Id. at 1171 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 633a(a)).
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impermissible, discriminatory act. This is separate from the causation
question, which asks whether that act is properly linked to the plaintiff's
harm.2 6 7 This, and not just but-for causation, is arguably "the background
against which Congress legislate [s]."268 As the Babb Court itself stated in the
first sentence of its decision a few weeks earlier in Comcast, "[flew legal
principles are better established than the rule requiring a plaintiff to establish
causation."2 6 9 In Babb, however, the Court effectively sanctioned a finding of
liability without causation.270
Relatedly, as I argued above, and as Justice Thomas highlighted in his
dissenting opinion, the any-consideration standard can be satisfied even if a
plaintiff obtained a favorable employment outcome.2 71 So long as age is
considered in a promotion decision, an employee could satisfy the Court's
standard, even if he in fact received the promotion.
Finally, like the motivating-factor test, the Court's "any-consideration"
standard is vague. As discussed earlier in relation to the motivating-factor test,
it is unclear what evidence would allow a jury to conclude that this standard is
satisfied.272 For example, would an earlier racist remark suffice? As in Babb,
disparate-treatment cases frequently do not involve an explicit calculation,
such as that provided in the Court's hypothetical. Ultimately, a jury would
decide based on its intuition regarding responsibility, not causation. This
vagueness can cause poor deterrence and inappropriate findings of liability,
ultimately leading to suboptimal incentives and behavior.
The factorial framework does not encounter these problems. It applies a
standard of causation that is based on the common and scientific notion of
cause and effect. Unlike the standard articulated in Babb, causation under the
proposed framework is determined with reference to the employment
decision and is dependent on a form of difference in the employment outcome.
Moreover, it is consistent with good policy and Congress's likely intent. In
particular, it allows a finding of liability, even when discriminatory conduct is
accompanied by other sufficient causes. Applying the NESS test to the
Supreme Court's illustration, the test might ask, assuming the 35-year-old and
55-year-old had the same amount of points, would age have made the
difference between the plaintiff receiving the promotion and not receiving

Arguably, discrimination, or "differential treatment," can be understood as the "harm"
267.
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the promotion? If he would receive a 5-point deduction due to age, then the
NESS test is met.
On the other hand, the proposed framework excludes counterintuitive
and counterproductive outcomes that could result from the vague anyconsideration or motivating-factor tests. For example, it would exclude
liability when discrimination is altogether preempted by another condition,
such as the absence of minimal qualifications (e.g., the absence of a driver's
license for a driving position) or the absence of ajob opening. It would also
not easily allow a racist jury to render a finding of no liability even when
discrimination is a clear cause of an adverse employment decision.
Moreover, the Comcast and Babb decisions highlight two other advantages
of the factorial framework. First, it is important to realize that Babb's anyconsideration test, like Price Waterhouse's burden-shifting paradigm, severely
limits a plaintiff's possible relief when the plaintiff cannot demonstrate butfor causation. In many contexts, this may lead to suboptimal incentives with
respect to litigation and deterrence. For example, in Babb's point-system
illustration, it is possible that a plaintiff's inability to obtain monetary relief
may undermine the incentive to sue, leading to suboptimal levels of
deterrence.273 Arguably, this is again a byproduct of choosing between two
inadequate standards.
The factorial framework allows for a more nuanced approach to relief. If
the protected feature satisfies NESS, then monetary relief could be available
to the plaintiff, subject to a damages analysis, which may result in an
apportionment of damages based on causation and other considerations.274
This approach may promote better incentives.
Second, these two cases, decided only weeks apart, resulted in two distinct
standards of causation. Arguably, the Supreme Court's decision in Babb
involves an altogether new causal standard-the any-consideration test. The
diversity of causal standards that govern disparate-treatment cases is arguably
illogical and inequitable, but it is a natural consequence of choosing between
two inadequate standards based on distinct language across various
antidiscrimination statutes. The factorial framework avoids this problem. By
providing a theory and standard of causation that is consistent with the causal
language of the various statutes, as well as good policy and Congress's likely
intent, the factorial approach allows a single causal framework that reflects
actual cause and effect, and that is applicable to all disparate-treatment cases.
VI. CONCLUSION

Antidiscrimination law's current approach to causation is deeply flawed.
Its defects have caused an illogical, vague, and unworkable proof scheme that
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requires an overhaul in order to curb the harm that it engenders and to allow
the antidiscrimination statutes to serve their objectives effectively.
This Article proposes a causal theory and method that achieves this goal.
In particular, the proposed factorial approach adopts a concrete and wellestablished scientific framework, the potential-outcomes framework, that
permits clear and structured reasoning regarding causation, and an estimand,
the NESS estimand, that refines and, in a sense, unifies the but-for and
motivating-factor tests. By instilling nuance in the causal inquiry, and a logical
causal estimand, the factorial framework permits a simple and effective
method that is grounded in notions of actual cause and effect and basic tort
law.
The factorial framework carries important implications for the policy
objectives underlying antidiscrimination law. It employs a theory of causation
that reflects actual cause and effect and that promotes the law's deterrence
objectives while preventing windfall recoveries and their distorting effects on
incentives. The factorial framework also allows an interpretation of causal
language in antidiscrimination statutes that is consistent with good policy and
Congress's likely intent. This is not possible if courts only consider the but-for
and motivating-factor tests.
Finally, it is important to emphasize that the fact patterns underlying
disparate-treatment cases are diverse, and this Article does not attempt to
analyze the implications of the factorial framework with respect to the
particulars of each and every possible disparate-treatment scenario. Additional
nuance is surely needed. This Article, however, aims to establish a foundation
for future analysis and development, and, ultimately, for the proposed
framework's application as a logical and effective standard of causation in
antidiscrimination law, and disparate-treatment cases in particular. This
foundation could eliminate confusion and promote a more coherent and
effective system of antidiscrimination law.

